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Abstract
Nowadays, computers and network communications have a pervasive presence
in all our daily activities. Their correct configuration in terms of security is
becoming more and more complex due to the growing number and variety of
services present in a network.
Generally, the security configuration of a computer network is dictated by
specifying the policies of the security controls (e.g. firewall, VPN gateway)
in the network. This implies that the specification of the network security
policies is a crucial step to avoid errors in network configuration (e.g., blocking
legitimate traffic, permitting unwanted traffic or sending insecure data).
In the literature, an anomaly is an incorrect policy specification that an
administrator may introduce in the network. In this thesis, we indicate as policy
anomaly any conflict (e.g. two triggered policy rules enforcing contradictory
actions), error (e.g. a policy cannot be enforced because it requires a crypto-
graphic algorithm not supported by the security controls) or sub-optimization
(e.g. redundant policies) that may arise in the policy specification phase.
Security administrators, thus, have to face the hard job of correctly specify-
ing the policies, which requires a high level of competence. Several studies have
confirmed, in fact, that many security breaches and breakdowns are attributable
to administrators’ responsibilities.
Several approaches have been proposed to analyze the presence of anomalies
among policy rules, in order to enforce a correct security configuration. However,
we have identified two limitations of such approaches. On one hand, current
literature identifies only the anomalies among policies of a single security
technology (i.e., IPsec, TLS), while a network is generally configured with
many technologies. On the other hand, existing approaches work on a single
policy type, also named domain (i.e., filtering, communication protection).
xUnfortunately, the complexity of real systems is not self-contained and each
network security control may affect the behavior of other controls in the same
network.
The objective of this PhD work was to investigate novel approaches for
modelling security policies and their anomalies, and formal techniques of
anomaly analysis. We present in this dissertation our contributions to the
current policy analysis state of the art and the achieved results.
A first contribution was the definition of a new class of policy anomalies,
i.e. the inter-technology anomalies, which arises in a set of policies of multiple
security technologies. We provided also a formal model able to detect these new
types of anomalies. One of the results achieved by applying the inter-technology
analysis to the communication protection policies was to categorize twelve new
types of anomalies. The second result of this activity was derived from an
empirical assessment that proved the practical significance of detecting such
new anomalies.
The second contribution of this thesis was the definition of a newly-defined
type of policy analysis, named inter-domain analysis, which identifies any
anomaly that may arise among different policy domains. We improved the
state of the art by proposing a possible model to detect the inter-domain
anomalies, which is a generalization of the aforementioned inter-technology
model. In particular, we defined the Unified Model for Policy Analysis (UMPA)
to perform the inter-domain analysis by extending the analysis model applied
for a single policy domain to comprehensive analysis of anomalies among many
policy domains. The result of this last part of our dissertation was to improve
the effectiveness of the analysis process. Thanks to the inter-domain analysis,
indeed, administrators can detect in a simple and customizable way a greater
set of anomalies than the sets they could detect by running individually any
other model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays, computers and network communications have a pervasive presence
in all our daily activities. Their correct configuration in terms of security is
becoming more and more complex due to the growing number and variety of
network services offered to end-users.
Security administrators, thus, have to face with this hard job, which requires
very specific skills and a high level of competence. The specification of security
configurations requires the definition of several technical details among several
alternatives, such as security proprieties (e.g. confidentiality and data integrity),
security protocols, cipher-suites, and timeouts.
Due to the complexity of the configuration security controls (e.g. firewall,
VPN-gateway, authentication manager), several studies have confirmed, in fact,
that many security breaches and breakdowns are attributable to administrators’
responsibilities.
Wool showed that most of the firewalls he analyzed contained several
problematic policies, such as very lax rules [1]:
“Firewalls are (still) poorly configured, and a rule set’s complexity is (still)
positively correlated with the number of detected configuration errors.”.
As with years past, the 2014, 2015 and 2016 Data Breach Investigations
Report [2–4] states that administrators were the prime actors in security
incidents. As Fig. 1.1 show over 60% of incidents depend on human errors.
When looking for the causes of security problems, a US government funded
2 Introduction
Fig. 1.1 Percentage of errors.
study reported also that the skills and competence of security administrators
had strongly decreased [5].
In the last decades, the typical approach has been trial-and-error. When
one or more misconfigurations are reported, the administrators corrected them
by creating ad-hoc rules and repeat the process until (hopefully) no more errors
are present. This methodology, although simple, is a temporary palliative
since it can produce serious maintenance problems in the future. Guaranteeing
the absence of misconfigurations is however nearly impossible without an
appropriate software tool. It is therefore highly desirable to have a practical
solution to evaluate the security configurations actually enforced which is based
on sound theoretical foundations.
In order to simplify the administrator work, a different network and security
configuration approach based on policy management was suggested in literature
in [6]. The policy-based network management paradigm proposes administrators
to define the security requirements by means of a set of business-level statements,
namely policy, that are later manually or semi-automatically refined into low-
level configurations for the available security controls.
From the point of view of the administrators, the introduction of a policy-
based approach has simplified network management, but it has introduced other
possibilities of faults and errors to take into account. An ambiguous policy
3specification, in fact, may bring to an anomalous network configuration, which,
in turn, may result in serious breaches and network vulnerability (e.g. blocking
legitimate traffic, permitting unwanted traffic or sending insecure data). Thus,
we are interested in investigating on novel approaches of anomaly analysis in
network policies.
In this thesis, we define an anomaly as any incorrect policy specification
that an administrator may introduce in the network. In particular, we indicate
as policy anomaly any conflict, error or sub-optimization that may arise in the
policy specification phase. Examples of anomalies are when two triggered policy
rules enforce contradictory actions, or when a policy cannot be enforced due to
the device capabilities (e.g. the security administrators chooses a technology
not supported by an end-point or a security level too high to be enforced by the
available cipher-suites), or also if the administrator defines redundant policies.
The literature has already addressed the anomaly analysis among network
policies by proposing many works. However, one of the major limitations
of such proposals is that each solution focuses on a specific policy domain.
Example of domains where a policy-based management can be applied are
communication protection [7], filtering [8], service function chaining [9] and
others.
Another limitation is that such works have not been ported into the real
activities of a network administrator1, as well as the major part of them
generally focuses on a single network security technology.
Nevertheless, the complexity of real systems is not self-contained, these
approaches overlook: (i) the effects of the overlapping of multiple protection
techniques; (ii) the behaviour that each network function may affect respect to
other functions.
Hence it could be useful an approach of analysis and detection that gives
an overview of the network errors and conflicts deriving from the wrong pol-
icy specification. For example, having a dashboard containing any irregular
network conditions and events detected by the analysis approach and that an
administrator wants to monitor and to be alerted (i.e. no errors and conflicts)
could make more flexible and efficient the network configuration task.
1The only notable exception is the detection of the packet filter anomalies classified by
Al-Shaer [8], which is available in some Cisco routers [10].
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Therefore, in this PhD thesis we present:
1. a complete analysis of issues related to the network security policies to
prevent the presence of anomalies at run-time;
2. novel classes of policy analysis, i.e. Inter-technology and Inter-domain,
which aim at covering a more comprehensive set of anomalies; such newly-
introduced classes help in discovering twelve new types of anomalies,
whose presence in the networks has been proved by means of an empirical
assessment;
3. the definition of a unified model for policy analysis, which embraces
many types of analysis into a single one. This unification improves the
performance of the analysis process, because administrators will be able
to detect a greater set of anomalies than the sets they could detect by
running individually any other model.
1.1 Thesis organization
Most of the work presented in this thesis is unpublished, and it aims at extending
our previous works. In particular, we have divided this dissertation in four
parts:
1. Network Security Policy
The first part of this disclosure aims at providing a complete overview of
the network policy world, which helps the readers in understanding the
current literature on this field and how we improve it. Part of the work
presented in this first part is partially described in:
• So you want to write a paper on policy analysis?. Submitted to:
ACM Computing Surveys;
• Distributed Security Policy Analysis, the PhD thesis of Chistian
Pitscheider.
We have divided the first part of the thesis in to three chapters:
1.1 Thesis organization 5
Chapter 2: provides a background on the network policies, by presenting
also the nomenclature of the fundamental concepts associated to
the network policies, such as policy rules and anomalies, and also a
taxonomy of the main types of policies;
Chapter 3: presents the current state of the art related to policy analysis
with a special focus on its main applications, which are anomaly
analysis, reachability analysis and comparison analysis;
Chapter 4: describes how our work improves the current state of the
art related to network policy analysis, presenting our contributions
to the anomaly analysis of security policies;
2. Communication Protection Policies
In this second part, we apply one of the new classes of anomaly analysis
that we have defined to an already existing type of policy, i.e. the Inter-
technology analysis to the Communication Protection Policies. Part of
this work has been presented in the following papers:
• Inter-technology conflict analysis for communication protection poli-
cies. In: CRiSIS-2014: 9th International Conference on Risks and
Security of Internet and Systems, Trento (Italy), 27-29 August 2014.
pp. 148-163. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17127-2.
• Classification and analysis of communication protection policy anoma-
lies. In: IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
doi:10.1109/TNET.2017.2708096.
The second part of this thesis is composed of three chapters:
Chapter 5: aims at presenting the formal model used to perform the
anomaly analysis in the context of the communication protection
policies. Here, we introduce the formal structures of the policies and
the formulas to define and identify the anomalies against a set of
policies;
Chapter 6: introduces a new graphical notation for reporting in a more
intuitive way an anomaly that arises among a set of communication
protection policies;
6 Introduction
Chapter 7: concludes the second part of the thesis by showing the
complexity and performance of the presented approach and the
results of an empirical study carried out to prove the presence of
anomalies in the context of communication protection policies;
3. Unified Model for Policy Analysis
The last part of this disclosure aims at unifying all of the approaches
and models of policies analysis that have been proposed in the literature
or in this thesis. In particular, this part of our dissertation takes its
fundamentals and is partially present in the following works:
• A Formal Model of Network Policy Analysis. In: RTSI 2015 -
First International Forum on Research and Technologies for Society
and Industry, Torino, Italy, 16-18 September 2015. pp. 516-522.
doi:10.1109/RTSI.2015.7325150
• Inter-function anomaly analysis for correct SDN/NFV deployment.
In: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NETWORK MANAGE-
MENT, 2016, 26, 1, pp. 25-43. doi:10.1002/nem.1917
We have divided this last part in three chapters:
Chapter 8: presents a novel model of policy analysis that unifies the
existing one (i.e. the Unified Model for Policy Analysis - UMPA),
by describing its formal structure and characteristics;
Chapter 9: shows how we applied the UMPA model into three case
studies (i.e. filtering, communication protection and traffic flow
policy), in order to validate the correctness and usefulness of our
approach;
4. Summation on Network Security Policies Analysis
We conclude this disclosure with Chapter 10, which summarizes the
accomplishments of this work and presents possible directions to undertake
as future works for each work we presented.
Network Security Policy

Chapter 2
Network Security Policy:
Definitions
The first definition of policy was introduced by D. Clark and D. Wilson in [11]:
“A security policy specify the security goals that the system must meet
and the threats it must resist. For example, the high-level security goals most
often specify that the system should prevent unauthorized disclosure or theft
of information, should prevent unauthorized modification of information, and
should prevent denial of service”.
In the same period another definition of policy was presented by D.C. Robin-
son and M.S. Sloman in [12]:
“A management policy defines the set of rules for achieving these objectives.
For example, access control policy is the set of rules defining the resources a user
can access and fault management policy defines where a fault should be reported
and any recovery action. The policy is defined by the system administrators. ”
Twelve years later, the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) standardized
these two definitions of policy in the RFC-3198 [13] (Terminology for Policy-
Based Management):
“Policy can be defined from two perspectives: (i) a definite goal, course or
method of action to guide and determine present and future decisions. Policies
are implemented or executed within a particular context (such as policies defined
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within a business unit); (ii) policies as a set of rules to administer, manage,
and control access to network resources [14]”.
The RFC-3198 also provides other definitions and explanations of terms
related to network security policy. We report the most relevant ones for this
work:
policy rule: a basic building block of a policy-based system. A policy rule is
assumed to be in ECA form (Event-Condition-Action). The fundamental
construct of ECA is reactive rule in the form: “On Event If Condition
Do Action”, which means: “when Event occurs, if Condition is verified,
then execute Action”.
As Fig. 2.1 shown the clauses of Conditions and Actions associated with
a policy rule are modelled, respectively, with aggregations of the classes
Policy Event, Policy Condition and Policy Action.
policy event: is defined as any important occurrence in time of a change in
the system being managed, and/or in the environment of the system
being managed. It is used to determine whether the Condition clause of
Policy Rule can be evaluated or not. Examples of an Event include time
and user actions (e.g. logon, logoff, add, update, delete).
policy condition: a representation of the necessary state and/or prerequisites
that define whether a policy rule’s actions should be performed. When
the policy condition(s) associated with a policy rule evaluate to TRUE,
then (subject to other considerations such as rule priorities and decision
strategies) the rule may be enforced.
network fields: represent the possible values of the corresponding fields in a
packet that matches this rule. Examples of such network fields (but are
not limited to) could be the packet headers (e.g. source and destination IP
addresses, the port numbers, the MIME type). In fact, other information
(e.g. network node ID, traffic label, cipher algorithm etc...) could be
needed to designate the events and conditions to manage.
policy action: definition of what is to be done to enforce a policy rule, when
the conditions of the rule are met. Policy actions may result in the
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execution of one or more operations to affect and/or configure network
traffic and network resources.
policy abstraction: policy can be represented at different levels, ranging
from business goals to device-specific configuration parameters. Trans-
lation between different levels of "abstraction" may require information
other than policy, such as network and host parameter configuration and
capabilities.
security control: are appliances or software modules within a network. They
implement the functionalities needed to enforce a network security policy.
Security controls can inspect the network traffic and block certain packets
or modify it by changing header information of certain packets. As an
example, packet filters, stateful firewalls, and application-level firewalls
are used to control the traffic, whereas IPsec gateways, Virtual Private
Network (VPN) terminators, and NAT/NAPT devices are able to modify
the traffic.
policy refinement: is the process to determine the resources needed to sat-
isfy policy requirements, to translate high-level policies into low-level
configurations that may be enforced by the system, to verify that the set
of lower level policies or configurations actually meets the requirements
of the high-level policy.
policy group: is a class representing a container, aggregating either policy
rules or other policy groups. It allows the grouping of rules into a Policy.
As reported in the survey [15], many proposals have been applied to analyse
different types of policies: confidentiality, integrity, role base access control,
military security, management and networking. In this thesis, we focused on
one of this policy domain, that is the network security domain. We state for
Network Security Policy (NSP) a special kind of policy that focuses on security
aspects of a network.
Many types of NSPs exist and we present them in the next section (Sec-
tion 2.1).
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Policy Group
Policy Rule
Policy Conditions
Conditions List
Policy ActionPolicy Event
Fig. 2.1 Policy Rule Structure.
2.1 Policy types
In the domain of network security policies, there are many security controls
that may drop, alter, or direct traffic. As shown in Fig. 2.2, we have considered
in our analysis three main types of policies, which are forward, transformation
and monitoring.
The forwarding policies permit to limit or modify the traversal of traffic
across the boundaries of a network based on filtering and forwarding rules. We
consider as forwarding policies the filtering and traffic flow policies.
The transformation policies specify what type of traffic should be modified
and the nature of changes.
The monitoring policies specify wide range of traffic tasks and events to
analyse.
The following sections give a brief description of each policy type, while
more technical and specific details are reported in Chapter 5 and Chapter 9.
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Network
Security
Policy
Fig. 2.2 Classification of network security policy types.
2.1.1 Filtering Policy
In our analysis, we consider four categories of filtering policies: packet filter,
stateful filter, application filter and content filter.
Each category of filtering policy differs from the other ones for the considered
network fields. The filtering actions, instead, are either to accept, which permits
the packet to be delivered into or from the secure network, or to deny, which
causes the packet to be blocked.
Packet Filter A packet filter rule is typically composed of five network
fields [16]: protocol type, source and destination IP addresses, source and
destination ports. Its common format of rules in a firewall policy is the
followings:
<order> <src_IP> <src_Port>
<dst_IP> <dst_Port> <protocol> <action>
The rule order determines its position relative to other filtering rules. IP
addresses can be a network peer (e.g. 140.192.37.120), or a network address (e.g.
140.192.37.*). Ports can be either a specific port number, a range or placeholder,
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order src_IP src_Port dst_IP dst_Port protocol action
R1 1 192.168.1.* * * 80 * deny
R2 2 192.168.1.* 0-1024 192.168.3.* 0-1024 TCP allow
R3 3 192.168.1.* 0-1024 192.168.2.* 22 * allow
R4 4 192.168.1.1 * 192.168.2.* * UDP deny
R5 5 192.168.*.* * 192.168.*.* * * allow
Table 2.1 Example of packet filter rules.
indicated by “any” or “*”, to represent all port number. An extract of a packet
filterer policy is shown in Table 2.1.
In same cases, the packet filtering condition set supports time-based condi-
tions [14] and its structure can be extended with a further field: Its common
format of rules in a firewall policy is the followings:
<order> <src_IP> <src_Port> <dst_IP>
<dst_Port> <protocol> <time> <action>
Stateful Filtering The stateful filtering improves the packet filter functional-
ity by also maintaining connection states at the transport layer, and it analyses
the informations in DNS and ICMP messages. The Stateful firewall gives origin
to stateful firewalls (or stateful packet filter) [17]:
“If a firewall decides the fate of every packet solely by examining the packet
itself, then the firewall is called a stateless firewall. If a firewall decides
the fate of some packets not only by examining the packet itself but also by
examining the packets that the firewall has accepted previously, then the firewall
is called a stateful firewall [18]”.
The stateful firewalls analyse the transport headers, and maintain a state
table that associates a set of Boolean variables to each connection (frag, tcp_flg,
tcp_opt, syn, tcp_state). In addition to the filtering action, the stateful firewalls
perform the action REJECT. The REJECT action works basically the same as
the DROP, but it also sends back an error message to the host that sent the
rejected packet.
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Application Filtering The application firewalls have the ability to (recur-
sively) extract nested information in TCP or UDP packets and take decisions
using application protocol data and states [19]. The most widespread specialized
firewall is the Web Application Firewall (WAF), which deeply analyzes HTTP
traffic. Typically an application firewall supports: (i) regular expressions to
define conditions on text fields, like URL (i.e. the domain filtering like path and
domain conditions on URL) and MIME type; (ii) application-proxy gateways
action to keep track of authenticated users and to limit the maximum number
of simultaneous users/connections per user.
Content Filtering Content filters restrict or block the access to resources
(like web or mail resources) that are deemed objectionable (such as drugs,
profanities, hate, pornography, etc...) [20]. Content filters usually works by
specifying regular expressions that, if matched, indicate undesirable content
that is to be screened out. Some content filters block images from websites
and webmails, by analysing the graphical content of an image, and block all
suspicious images, so that a blank or checkered box, is displayed in place of the
blocked image. Content filter and the products that offer this service can be
divided into Web filtering, which is the screening of Web sites or pages, and
e-mail filtering, winch is the screening of E-mail for spam or other objectionable
content.
2.1.2 Traffic Flow Policy
Routing security controls implement a packet forwarding on a static routing ta-
ble or a dynamic routing protocol (i.e. SDN-Software Defined Networking [21]).
Recently, traffic flow policies are typically used to split an entire network
into multiple logical (virtual) networks, called flow entries, that can be seen as
individual networks.
OpenFlow is an example of new technology used to add, update, and delete
flow entries, both reactively (in response to packets) and pro-actively [22].
The network fields, shown in Table 2.2, supported by OpenFlow are:
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Ingress port: the numerical representation of incoming port, starting at 1.
This may be a physical or switch-defined virtual port;
Ether src the Ethernet source address;
Ether dst the Ethernet destination address;
Ether type: the Ethernet type of the OpenFlow packet payload, after VLAN
tags;
VLAN id: the VLAN identifier of outermost VLAN tag;
VLAN priority: the VLAN PCP field of outermost VLAN tag;
MPLS label the MPLS label value in the MPLS header;
MPLS EXP traffic class: the MPLS experimental value1 in the MPLS header;
IPv4 src: the IPv4 source address (can use subnet mask or arbitrary bitmask);
IPv4 dst: the IPv4 destination address (can use subnet mask or arbitrary
bitmask);
IPv4 proto: the IPv4 protocol type;
IPv4 src port: the IPv4 source port number;
IPv4 dst port: the IPv4 destination port number;
IPv4 ToS bits: the IPv4 type of service;
ICMP type: the ICMP type value;
ICMP code: the ICMP code value;
1Used fot QoS marking; the field is no longer used for truly experimental purposes.
2.1 Policy types 17
In
gr
es
s
po
rt
Et
he
rn
et
sr
c
Et
he
rn
et
ds
t
Et
he
rn
et
ty
pe
V
la
n
id
V
la
n
pr
io
rit
y
M
PL
S
la
be
l
M
PL
S
EX
P
IP
v4
sr
c
IP
v4
ds
t
IP
v4
pr
ot
oc
ol
IP
v4
sr
c
po
rt
IP
v4
ds
t
po
rt
IP
v4
To
S
bi
ts
IC
M
P
ty
pe
IC
M
P
co
de
Table 2.2 Fields from packets used to match against flow entries.
2.1.3 Communication Protection Policy
Communication protection policies (CPPs) originate from legal (e.g. the EU
privacy law [23]) and business security requirements, because they are used to
specify how to protect network communications. Their correct deployment is
then crucial in several areas, such as protection of intellectual properties, and
confidentiality of financial or corporate data. In some cases, such as companies
that host services or provide cloud-based resources, CPPs may be extremely
complex and articulated.
Communication protection policies can be enforced by using different se-
curity protocols, like IPsec [24], TLS [25], SSH [26], WS-Security [27] and
S-FTP [28]. Due to this, CPPs have to include several types of parameters,
which generally are cypher suites, time-outs, end-points, traffic types to be
protected, and type of tunnels (i.e. end-to-end channels or site-to-site).
In this paragraph we do not provide further details about the CPPs and their
formalism, because they are presented in depth in Chapter 5, while examples
of low-level configurations to implement CPPs are provided in Appendix B.1
2.1.4 Network Translation Policy
Translation devices include Network Address Translation (NAT) and Network
Address and Port Translation (NAPT) controls, they modify the packet header
according to a policy.
NAT changes the IP addresses and NAPT changes IP address and ports [29].
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2.1.5 Monitoring Policy
The monitoring policies are mainly divided in four main groups of policy types:
intrusion detection, service monitoring, vulnerability monitoring and traffic
monitoring.
In all monitoring policies, the policy conditions are assessed to a set of
network/security measurements, while the actions consist in solving, limiting
or alerting suspicious behaviour.
Network and security measurements are roughly divided into two groups
that are passive and active measurement. Passive measurement measure net-
work traffic by observation, without injecting additional traffic in the form of
probe packets. The advantage of a passive measurement is that it does not
generate additional network overhead, and thus does not influence network
performance. Unfortunately, passive measurements rely on installing in-network
traffic monitors, which is not feasible for all networks and require large invest-
ments. Active measurements, on the other hand, inject additional packets into
the network, monitoring their behaviour For example, the popular application
“ping” uses ICMP packets to reliably determine end-to-end connection status
and compute a path’s round-trip time.
Chapter 3
Network Security Policy:
Analysis
In this thesis, we refer policy analysis as the general process that analyses and
checks the violation of some properties against a set of policies. Many possible
applications of this process have been identified in the literature. In particular,
we divided the policy analysis in Anomaly analysis, Reachability analysis and
Policy comparison.
The Anomaly Analysis searches for any incorrect policy specification that
an administrator may introduce in the network, which we indicate as anomalies.
It checks any potential error, conflict and sub-optimization within a single or a
set of security policies.
Instead the Reachability Analysis evaluates allowed communications within
a computer network. It can determine if a certain host can reach a service or a
set of services. In general, reachability analysis is performed on-line by using
tools such as “ping” or “traceroute”. By using an accurate representation of the
network and its security policies, reachability analysis can also be performed
off-line, on an abstract network and policy representation, during the design
phase.
The last is the Policy Comparison, which compares two or more network
security policies and represents the differences between them in an intuitive
way. In this thesis, a network security policy includes a single or a set of
concrete security control configurations, or high-level security requirements
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to be enforced in the whole network. One of the best use-cases of policy
comparison is to verify that a desired network security policy is implemented
correctly by comparing the designed high-level policy with the concrete network
configuration. In addition the policy comparison is used to detect difference
with previous version in case of (dynamic) changes.
The rest of the section presents the state of art for each type of analysis.
We also provide in Appendix A some concepts and definitions about the
mathematical models exploited in the Policy Analysis approaches presented in
the literature.
3.1 Anomaly analysis
A policy anomaly, typically, occurs when a set of policies (two or more) are
simultaneously satisfied. This implies that the combined actions of the policies
may produce different results depending on the order of execution of these
actions.
In this thesis, we distinguish three types of policy anomaly, which are:
• Policy conflict: it arises when the effect of one security policy is influ-
enced or altered by another one, e.g. the actions of two rules (that are
both satisfied simultaneously) contradict each other. The policy systems
must provide conflict detection and avoidance or resolution mechanisms
to prevent this situation;
• Policy error: it occurs when the attempts to enforce the policy actions
fail, either due to temporary state or permanent mismatch between the
policy actions and the device enforcement capabilities;
• Policy sub-optimization: when redundant rules or other more efficient
policy implementations (in terms of resources and security) are present.
Policy anomaly can often occur when there are multiple authors defining
policies for a given system (network and security administrators). The creation
or modification of a policy is a difficult task, because a new/updated policy
can affect the behaviour of existing policies, defined by other people in different
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times. Therefore, the correct refinement of network policies is challenging since
an administrator must infer and choose several technical details among several
alternatives. For example, in case of a security requirement wanting to enforce
secure communications, an administrator should select the security protocol,
the cipher-suite, the timeouts, and other parameters to apply.
Then, we need to apply an anomaly analysis process in order to look for any
anomaly (i.e. conflict, error and sub-optimization) within a set of policy rules.
Up to now, the literature has applied the anomaly analysis to a single policy
or to a set of policies of interconnected security controls. Those methodologies
are known in the literature respectively as the Intra-policy and Inter-policy
analysis, of which we provide further details in the next sections.
3.1.1 State of the Art
In literature, anomaly analysis is mainly applied to single types of security
controls and there is no complete solution that analyses all types of security
controls. In particular, research is mainly concentrated on Intra- and Inter-
policy analysis of packet filter and IPsec configurations.
Packet Filtering Qian et al. [30] propose a framework to automate Access
Control List (ACL) analysis, capable of detecting and removing redundant
rules. Furthermore, the proposed algorithm is also capable of discovering and
repairing inconsistent rules, of merging overlapping or adjacent rules, and
rewriting ACLs to be more readable. This was one of the first proposals that
aims at resolving policy misconfigurations. The limitation of this work is that
it considers only few types of policy anomalies.
The anomaly analysis of packet filtering policy was firstly introduced by
Al-Shaer and Hamed [16]. The authors present a classification scheme for packet
filter rule relations, based on which they defined the four types of Intra-policy
rule anomalies (shadowing, correlation, generalization and redundancy).
“Two rules are shadowed when they enforce different actions and both rules
match the same packets. Two rules are correlated when they enforce different
actions and both rules have some matching packets in common. A rule is a
generalization of a second rule when they enforce different actions and the
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second rule matches the same packets as the first one but not vice versa. Two
rules are redundant when they enforce the same action and match the same
packets.”
Then, Al-Shaer et al. introduce an extension of the Intra-policy clas-
sification analysis base, called Inter-policy rule anomalies, in the extension
of the first paper [8]. Inter-policy analysis evaluates rule relations between
serially-connected packet filters. Al-Shaer et al. define five new Intra-policy
anomalies (shadowing, spuriousness, redundancy, correlation and irrelevance).
“Two rules from two different firewalls are shadowed when they match
the same packets and the rule from the first firewall blocks a packet that is
permitted by the second rule. Two rules from two different firewalls are spurious
when they match the same packets and the rule from the first firewall permits
the packet which is blocked by the second rule. Two rules from two different
firewalls are redundant when they match the same packets and both rules block
the packet. Two rules from two different firewalls are correlated when they have
some matching packets in common and enforce different actions. A rule is
classified as irrelevant if there is no possible traffic which can be matched by the
rule, for example the source and destination address belong to the same zone.”
Based on the work of Al-Shaer et al., other researchers proposed alternative
models and classification schemas. These works prove that Al-Shaer’s classifi-
cation scheme is valid and can be applied to real world scenarios. The main
limitation of all these approaches is that they cannot handle other security
controls but packet filters.
Firecrocodile [31], propose by Lehmann et al., was the first approach to help
network administrators to correctly configure PIX firewalls. The tool builds a
model which represents the PIX configuration file and performs the analysis on
it. In addition to anomaly analysis, they verify also the configuration file for
policy violations. Its main limitation is that it can analyse only Intra-policy
packet filtering rules of Cisco PIX configurations.
FIREMAN [32], propose by Yuan et al., uses binary decision diagrams
(BDDs) to represent packet filtering policies. In addition to an Intra-policy
analysis, it also verifies that an end-to-end policy is correctly implemented by
the filtering configurations. The model is designed for packet filters only and
does not support any other type of security control.
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Jeffrey et al. [33] propose to use a SAT-solver instead of BDDs for firewall
analysis. They claim that the problem can be represented as SAT and does not
require BDDs. The reduced complexity of the problem has a real advantage
in terms of performance. In the performance evaluation the authors also
reimplement FIREMAN with a SAT-solver and show that it is more efficient.
Ferraresi et al. [34] extend Al-Shaer’s classification and propose two
automatic anomaly resolution algorithms, providing a formal proof for the
existence of the solution and the algorithm convergence.
Golnabi et al. [35] extend Al-Shaer’s analysis using Association Rule Mining
(ARM), a data mining technique. The anomaly detection based on the mining
exposes many hidden but not detectable anomalies by analysing only the firewall
policy rules, resulting in two new non-systematic misconfiguration anomalies:
Blocking existing service and Allowing traffic to non-existing service anomaly.
The first misconfiguration case is blocking a legitimate traffic from a trusted
network to an “existing” service, while the other case of the misconfiguration
permits a traffic destined to a non-existing service.
Liu et al. [36] focus only on detecting and removing redundant rules. The
authors categorize redundant rules into upward redundant rules and downward
redundant rules. Upward redundant rules are rules that are never matched,
whereas downward redundant rules are rules that are matched but enforce the
same action as rules with lower priority. The model presented is based on a
data-structure named Firewall-Decision-Diagram (FDD).
Mohamed et al. [37] propose a complementary work called structured
firewall design, which consists of two steps. First, one designs a firewall
using a FDD instead of a sequence of possibly conflicting rules. Second, a
program converts the firewall decision diagram into a compact, yet functionally
equivalent, sequence of rules. This method addresses the consistency problem
because a FDD is anomaly-free.
Cuppens at al. [38] propose an anomaly resolution approach in addition
to the detection one. Although they support only shadowed and redundant
anomalies among single policies, their resulting policy is anomaly free. Another
feature of this model is that it can rewrite a policy in its positive or negative
form. The positive form of a policy contains only ALLOW rules whereas the
negative form only DENY rules. The authors extend their model to support
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also Inter-firewall analysis [39]. Furthermore, the authors define three new
anomalies (reflexivity, misconnection, and irrelevance). A reflexivity anomaly
occurs when both source and destination address are within the same zone. A
misconnection anomaly occurs when a rule blocks traffic that is not explicitly
blocked by the most-upstream firewall. An irrelevance anomaly occurs when a
firewall is not within the minimal route that connects the source zone1.
Garcia-Alfaro et al. [40] propose the integration of network intrusion
detection systems (NIDS). The proposed model can detect both Intra- and
Inter-policy packet filter rule anomalies. The main improvement over Al-Shaer’s
model is that it can also handle NIDS, and not only packet filters. The tool
can also verify which security controls are on the path of a given packet based
on its source and destination address. This work has been later integrated into
the MIRAGE tool [41].
Bouhoula et al. [42] suggest a different approach to this topic by using
an inference system to detect Intra-policy anomalies. They use the inference
system to construct a tree representation of the policy. The construction process
is efficient and optimized for memory consumption. The inference contains a
condition that stops the construction of a specific branch when no anomaly can
be found. The resulting classification tree contains rule anomalies in its leaves.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it is not able to check for Inter-policy
anomalies, furthermore it is not capable of handling security policies such as
IPsec/VPN.
Afterwards, Bouhoula et al. [43] propose an other formal approach for
detecting and solving firewall misconfigurations Their approach also detects
anomalies between multiple rules and not only rule pairs. Furthermore, they
introduce a new classification of firewall anomalies: superfluous rule-class
anomalies and conflicting rules-class anomalies. Superfluous rule-class anoma-
lies include the shadowing and redundant anomaly and conflicting rules-class
anomalies include the correlation and generalization anomaly. The new classifi-
cation is used because superfluous rule-class anomalies can be resolved by their
algorithm.
1This definition of irrelevance anomaly is different form the definition propose by Al-shaer
et al. in [8].
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Abedin et al. [44] present an algorithm that detects and solves any anomaly
present in the policy rules. The prosed algorithm operates by reordering and
splitting the existing set of rules in order to generate a new one that is anomaly-
free. The new set of rules will be smaller than the original one, by increasing
the overall efficiency of the firewall. This work has not been validated but has
a proof of correctness of the algorithm.
Basile et al. [45] present an new analysis derived form the work of Al-shaer
et al. [8]. The authors introduce a new formal model for policy specification,
named Geometrical Model [46], it is based on a set of rules, a default action
and a resolution strategy. The presented model can identify all types of Intra-
policy anomalies defined by Al-Shear. Furthermore, the authors present two
new anomaly types: general redundancy anomaly and the general shadowing
anomaly. The general redundancy anomaly occurs when a rule is redundant
due to the union of multiple rules. The general shadowing anomaly occurs
when a rule is shadowed by the union of multiple rules.
Hu et al. [47], [48] propose a rule-based segmentation technique and
a grid-based representation to identify policy anomalies and derive effective
anomaly resolutions. They also present a proof-of-concept implementation
of a visualization-based firewall policy analysis tool called Firewall Anomaly
Management Environment (FAME).
Basumatary et al. [9] propose a formal model for firewall anomaly detection.
They represent firewall rules by a topological-temporal model and use a model
checker to verify the firewall policy.
Krombi et al. [49, 50] propose a procedure that synthesizes an automaton
that implements a given security policy. They use our automaton to verify
completeness, detect anomalies, and discover functional discrepancies between
several implementations of a security policy.
Stateful firewalls Only recently stateful firewalls have been integrated into
analysis models. One of the few examples is presented in [51] and [17]. Cuppens
and Garcia-Alfaro [51] propose a solution for Intra-policy analysis of stateful
firewalls. With the introduction of stateful firewalls they also present new
types of anomalies classes (Intra-state and Inter-state rule anomalies). Intra-
state rule anomalies occur only between stateful rules and beside the known
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anomalies from the stateless analysis, include two new anomaly types. The
first new anomaly arises when the firewall blocks packets during the three-way
handshake. The second new anomaly arises when the firewall blocks packets
during the connection termination. Inter-state rule anomalies occur between
stateful and stateless rules when application layer protocols establish multiple
connections and at least one of these connections is blocked, an example of
such a protocol is FTP. The proposed algorithmic solution to handle and
eliminate such types of anomalies is based on a general automata describing
the stateful rules. This initial work has been completed and formalized in [17].
Although the introduction of stateful firewall into the analysis process was a
very important step, both solutions are still missing the Inter-policy analysis.
Application Firewall Basile et al. [52] present an extension of their Geo-
metrical Model which can perform anomaly analysis of application-level firewall
configurations. The extended model can identify all policy anomalies intro-
duced in their previous work. The main contribution of this improvement is
the anomaly analysis of firewall rules including regular expressions. The model
transforms the regular expressions into deterministic automata and calculates
rule intersection based on them.
Traffic flow policies In the last years, several works have been proposed
to find anomaly misconfigurations in OpenFlow, in order to allow multiple
applications to run on the same physical network in a non-conflicting manner.
Al-Shaer and Al-Haj present a tool, FlowChecker, to identify any Intra-switch
misconfiguration within a single FlowTable [53]. They also describe the Inter-
switch or Inter-federated inconsistencies in a path of OpenFlow switches across
the same or different OpenFlow infrastructures.
NICE, proposed by Canini et al. [54], performs a symbolic execution of
OpenFlow applications and applies a model checking technique to explore the
state space of an entire OpenFlow network.
Finally, Batista et al. present an approach for conflict detection using
several first-order logic rules to define possible antagonisms and employ an
inference engine to detect conflicting flows before the OpenFlow controller [55].
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Communication protection policies The current literature contains sev-
eral works about anomaly detection in CPPs, however, the research in this area
is solely focused on IPsec, and overlooks the effects of multiple overlapping
protection techniques.
Zao [56] introduce an approach based on the combination of conditions
that belong to different IPsec fields. The same idea was used by Fu et al. [7]
to describe a number of conflicts between IPsec tunnels, discovered through
a simulation process that reports security requirements violations. In their
analysis, the policy anomalies are identified by checking the IPsec configurations
against the desired policies written in a natural language. In practice, an
anomaly occurs when the policy implementations do not satisfy the desired
policies. In addition, Fu et al. propose a resolution process that finds alternative
configurations to satisfy the desired policy.
Al-Shaer et al. analyze the effects of IPsec rules on the protection of
networks [57], by proposing a number of ad-hoc algorithms and formulas to
detect these problems. They formalized the classification scheme of [7] and
proposed a model based on OBDD (Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams) that not
only incorporates the encryption capabilities of IPsec, but also its packet filter
capabilities. They also identify two new IPsec problems (channel-overlapping
and multi-transform anomalies). The first one occurs when multiple IPsec
sessions are established and the second session redirects the traffic of the first
one (similar to the case depicted in Fig. 5.4). On the other hand, the multi-
transform anomalies occur when a data protection is applied to an already
encapsulated IPsec traffic and the second protection is weaker than the first one.
The same authors also describe a classification system for conflicts between
filtering and communication protection policies [58].
Niksefat et al. [59] present a two improvements over the Al-Shaer’s solution
[57], a faster detection algorithm and the possibility to resolve the detected
anomalies.
Finally, Li et al. classify IPsec rules in two classes: access control lists
(ACL) and encryption lists (EL) [60].
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3.1.2 Summary of State of the Art and Research Direc-
tions
As shown in Table 3.1, there are may works on anomaly analysis of filtering
policies. For the most part they have been published between 2005 and 2008
and are related to packet filter. This area of anomaly analysis has been
extensively analysed and almost all of the works include an implementation and
are validated in a real scenario or by theorem proofs. Although the definition of
Inter-policy anomalies was defined in 2005, only few works support it. Despite
this last shortcoming, in our view the research on anomaly analysis of filtering
policies has reached maturity. Otherwise only recently anomalies in stateful
and application firewall policy have been analysed. We expect that these are
two hot topics in filtering policy anomaly analysis. The research is only at the
beginning and there can be introduced much more improvements.
Data Policy Type Features Validation
Y AUT CIT PKF SFF APF INT-PLC RSL PRT TST EMP THEO
[16] 2003 Al-Shaer 91 ✓
[8] 2005 Al-Shaer 141 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[35] 2006 Al-Shaer 41 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[31] 2006 Lehmann 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[32] 2006 Yuan 121 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[33] 2009 Jeffrey 29 ✓ ✓ ✓
[34] 2007 Ferraresi 12 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[36] 2005 Liu 30 ✓ ✓
[37] 2007 Liu 65 ✓ ✓
[38] 2005 Cuppens 47 ✓ ✓ ✓
[39] 2006 Cuppens 8 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[40] 2007 Cuppens 56 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[41] 2010 Cuppens 12 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[51] 2012 Cuppens 8 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[17] 2013 Cuppens 7 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[44] 2006 Abedin 18 ✓ ✓ ✓
[42] 18 Bouhoula 18 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[43] 2014 Bouhoula 7 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[46] 2008 Basile 5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[45] 2012 Basile 12 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[52] 2014 Basile 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[47] 2010 Hu 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[48] 2012 Hu 49 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[49] 2014 Krombi 2 ✓ ✓ ✓
[50] 2015 Krombi 1 ✓ ✓ ✓
Y= Year; AUT= Author (reference author); CIT= Citation numbers (scopus and/or scholar); PKF=Packet
Filter; SFF= Stateful Firewall; APF= Application Filter; INT-PLC= Inter-policy; RSL= Resolution; PRT=
Prototype; TST= Test; EMP= Empirical evaluation; THE= Theoretical validation
Table 3.1 Summary of state of the art in Filtering Policy Analysis.
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As shown in Table 3.2, there are much less works on anomaly analysis
of communication protection policy than in to filtering policy. Those papers
mainly focus on their analysis on potential incompatibilities and anomaly among
IPsec policies, such as redundancy protection anomaly or channel overlapping
misconfiguration. The authors overlook the possible interaction with other
policy of distinct technology (e.g. TLS, SSH). In our vision, the analysis of
anomalies that derive from the interactions between multiple technologies is an
interesting research topics.
Data Policy Type Features Validation
Y AUT CIT IPSec PKF INT-THC RSL PRT TST EMP THEO
[7] 2001 Fu 29 ✓ ✓ ✓
[57] 2005 Al-Shaer 38 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[58] 2006 Al-Shaer 88 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[60] 2006 LI 9 ✓ ✓ ✓
[59] 2010 Niksefat 6 ✓ ✓ ✓
Y= Year; AUT= Author (reference author); CIT= Citation numbers (scopus and/or scholar);
PKF=Packet Filter; INT-THC= Inter-technology; RSL= Resolution; PRT= Prototype; TST= Test;
EMP= Empirical evaluation; THE= Theoretical validation
Table 3.2 Summary of state of the art in communication protection policy analysis.
Finally, efficiency of a policy-based system is important in the same way
of having the means of detecting and resolving any anomalies that arise.
Unfortunately only a few works of filtering and communication protection
policy propose also anomaly resolution techniques in addition to the anomaly
analysis.
3.2 Reachability analysis
Reachability analysis evaluates allowed communications within a computer
network. Furthermore, it can determine if a certain host can reach a service or
a set of services.
“Quantifying and querying network reachability is important for security
monitoring and auditing as well as many aspects of network management such
as troubleshooting, maintenance, and design” [61].
Reachability analysis can be performed both online and offline. Online
reachability analysis is performed on a deployed system by injecting test packets
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and verifying on different points of the network that those packets are present.
Off-line reachability analysis is performed on a model of the system without
direct interaction with a real network.
Online reachability analysis
In the on-line reachability analysis, the correctness is guaranteed because real
packets are injected into the network and are processed by all devices on the
path. The disadvantage is that special probes have to be installed within the
network. Inserting these probes for the most use-cases is difficult and involves
a precise planning and execution. Due to this limitation, on-line reachability is
mainly used to verify the correct behaviour of single network components and
not for validating the entire network.
Offline reachability analysis
The off-line reachability analysis has the advantage that the system to be
analysed does not need to be deployed. This means that it can be used during
the design and maintenance tasks. Furthermore, it can also verify reachability
on alternative paths, and therefore test fault-tolerance properties of the systems.
This approach is much more dynamic and the planning and execution is much
less invasive than on-line approach. The disadvantage is that the correctness of
the result is based on the correctness of the model. This also implies that if
some parts of the network can not be expressed with the model, the application
of this type of analysis is limited or even impossible. Furthermore, all policies
must be represented correctly by the instantiation of the model.
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3.2.1 State of the Art
On-line reachability analysis in general is performed by using tools such as
“ping”, “traceroute”, and “tcpdump”. There are only a few publications regard-
ing this on-line reachability analysis. The general approach taken in literature
is to insert a traffic generator and a traffic analyser into the network. The most
promising work is presented by El-Atawy et al. [62] and Al-Shaer et al. [63],
because they propose a traffic generator analyses first the security policy and
based on this analysis, the most relevant packets are generated. The limitation
of these two works is that they can be applied to single firewalls only.
Brugger et al. [64] propose a different approach by using a test-policy
that generates the effective queries. This has the advantage that queries can
be written in a more abstract level and the reachability analysis is closer to a
policy comparison.
Mayer, Wool, and Ziskind [65] present a firewall analysis engine named
Fang. It is the first approach towards off-line reachability analysis of computer
networks containing only packet filters. The proposed solution takes as input
the network topology and the configuration files of the deployed packet filters.
A user interface to perform reachability queries is provided and the queries are
evaluated by the tool. In the extended versions of the paper [66] and [67] the
query interface has been improved and the most relevant queries are generated
automatically by the tool.
Marmorstein and Kearns [68] [69] [70] propose a tool named ITVal for
analysing IPtable configurations. It is the first open source implementation of
a firewall analyser capable of performing simple reachability queries.
Oliveira et al. [71] also propose an open source tool for firewall analysis
named Prometheus. They present a flow connectivity analysis to verify whether
a server is accessible from different locations of the network.
Eronen et al. [72] propose to use logic programming and a generic inference
engine to analyse Cisco router access lists. Their approach has the advantage
that reachability algorithms are not hard-coded. New rule analyzing functions
can easily be added and the expert knowledge can be expressed in a compact
form. Furthermore, their model can also analyse the rule structure, for example
if a rule is never matched.
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Hazelhurst [73] presents a model for reachability analysis and policy com-
parison. The model represents packet filter rules internally as BDDs and has a
graphical user interface (GUI) for human interaction. To perform a reachability
analysis the user expresses a query as a Boolean expression and the result is
displayed in tabular form. The user can express queries for packets, which
are allowed and denied. Furthermore, the output can be formatted to obtain
different levels of abstraction.
Xie et al. base their reachability analysis on graph theory and dynamic
programming [74]. The solution is able to calculate the upper and lower bound
of reachability. The upper bound defines that there is at least one possible
path for reachability and the lower bound defines that all possible paths
allow reachability. The model can be used to represent static NAT, routing
and filtering rules based on the destination addresses, but it does not take
into account the existence of connectionless and connection-oriented protocols.
Although the correctness of the model is given, it is purely theoretical and
lacks experimental results. Bandhakavi et al. [75] present an extension to
Xie’s work to overcome limitations. They use a more general model to describe
firewalls, packet filtering and transformation rules, thus adding the possibility
to handle policies that depend on source addresses and filtering states.
Matousek et. al. [76] present a formal model for reachability analysis
applied to networks containing packet filters and dynamic routing. The authors
propose to represent ACLs as a First-Order Logic (FOL) function and to use
Interval Decision Diagrams (IDDs) [77] to store them. IDDs are efficient for
conjunction, disjunction and inclusion over this functions.
Khakpour and Liu [78–80] present a reachability analysis tool called Quarnet.
Quarnet supports connectionless (stateless router/firewall and static NAPT)
and connection-oriented transport protocols (stateful router/firewall and dy-
namic NAPT). The paper presents a model for calculating network reachability
metrics and also includes a performance analysis. The solution is based on
an internal representation of the network on which reachability queries are
executed. The authors first calculate a Firewall Decision Diagram (FDD) to
represent the global policy and afterwards compute two matrices which contain
the effective reachability information needed. Although the single reachability
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queries are very fast to compute, the computation of the internal network
representation does not achieve similar times to the querying operations.
Nelson et al. [81] present a firewall analysis tool named Margrave, which
is able to perform basic reachability queries.
Mai et al. [82] present a reachability verification algorithm based on a SAT
solver, where the reachability query is represented as a Boolean formula. The
SAT solver searches for a symbolic packet which can be forwarded between two
vertices of the network.
Al-Shaer et al. [83] present a tool named ConfigChecker. The tool models
the global end-to-end behaviour of a network and can perform reachability
verification, identify bogus entries, verify IPsec tunnel integrity and discover
backdoors.
Another theoretical approach used to compute the network-wide reachability,
has been proposed by Sveda et al. [84]. This approach uses traditional graph-
based algorithms, such as Floyd-Marshall, whereas [74] and [75] require ad-hoc
techniques to mimic routing protocols. To calculate the reachability of the
network these other works use the encoding problem into SAT instance solved
by automatized solvers. They describe how to represent both routing and
filtering devices, but do not mention how to express packet transformation
rules.
Kazemian et al. [85] present a generalization of Xie’s work [74] based on
“Header space” information of packets. Their algorithm is compatible with
filtering, routing, and transformation technologies. However, this approach is
limited to packet filters and cannot be used for filtering and security devices
which work at a higher level of the ISO/OSI stack.
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3.2.2 Summary of State of the Art and Research Direc-
tions
Table 3.3 summarizes the difference in publications regarding reachability
analysis. In summary all publications support packet filter, just a few of those
works support also routing and NAT and only [64] support the stateful firewalls.
The main technique used for reachability is off-line analysis.
Although there are different models of analysis, as concerning performance
testing and validation, these are carried on just by very few works in real use
cases. At the best of our knowledge, in the current literature none has faced
the problem to extend reachability analysis in VPN context.
Taking into account the single limitations of each work and the common
shortage of the whole literature, we think that unique model that embeds on it
all the different network and security controls is needed.
Data Policy Type Features Validation
Y AUT CIT PKF SFF NAT ROU ON OFF PRT TST EMP THEO
[65] 2000 Mayer ✓ ✓ ✓
[67] 2006 Mayer ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[66] 2001 Wool ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[72] 2001 Eronen 60 ✓ ✓
[73] 2003 Hazelhurst 60 ✓ ✓
[74] 2005 Xie 60 ✓ ✓ ✓
[68] 2005 Marmorstein 18 ✓ ✓
[69] 2005 Marmorstein 8 ✓ ✓ ✓
[70] 2007 Marmorstein 3 ✓
[62] 2005 Al-Shaer 24 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[63] 2005 Al-Shaer 28 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[83] 2005 Al-Shaer 3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[76] 2008 Matoušek 19 ✓ ✓
[71] 2009 Oliveira 8 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[75] 2008 Bandhakavi 2 ✓ ✓ ✓
[78] 2009 Liu 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[79] 2010 Liu 9 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[80] 2013 Liu 11 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[81] 2010 Nelson 40 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[82] 2011 Mai 135 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[85] 2012 Kazemian 113 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[64] 2013 Brugger 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Y= Year; AUT= Author (reference author); CIT= Citation numbers (scopus and/or scholar); PKF=Packet Filter;
SFF= Stateful Firewall; ROU= Routing; ON= On-line verification; OFF= Off-line verification; PRT= Prototype;
TST= Test; EMP= Empirical evaluation; THE= Theoretical validation
Table 3.3 Summary of state of the art in Reachability Analysis.
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3.3 Policy comparison
Policy comparison has different application scopes, in general it can be divided
into two categories: change impact and implementation verification.
Change impact is used to verify the effective impact on a policy after
inserting, removing and/or modifying a policy. Therefore, the original policy is
compared with the modified one.
The implementation verification instead is used to verify that a policy
implementation is correct and enforces all rules as specified in the design policy.
In this scenario, the design policy for the most part is written in a high-level
language.
The change impact and implementation verification can be both applied on
single and multiple policy comparison. Single policy comparison is performed
between two single policies one to one. This approach is limited to one single
policy type, therefore a filtering policy can not be compared with a data
protection policy. Multi policy comparison is performed between to complete
network configurations and associated policies. In this case, different types of
policies can be involved at the same time.
3.3.1 State of the Art
Guttman [86] presents the first model of policy comparison. It can generate
for a given network the required access control lists based on a global policy.
Furthermore, the global policy can be used as a reference for the model to
verify access control lists. This model has be extended [87] to support also
IPsec gateways within the network.
Fu et al. [7] present a solution to verify the correct implementation of
IPsec policies. The algorithm presented takes as input high-level security
policies describing an implementation and compares it with a desired end-to-
end policy. Even though the algorithm is able to compare a desired policy with
its implementation, it cannot been used to compare a modified policy with
its original version. Furthermore, it only supports IPsec policies and does not
support routing or other transformation policies.
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Hazelhurst [73] presents a model focused on reachability analysis and policy
comparison. The model represents packet filter rules internally as BDDs and
has a GUI for human interaction. The policy comparison can compare an
original policy with a modified one. This model, in summary, shows if the two
policies are equivalent or contain differences. The differences can be displayed in
two modes, newdeny and newallow. The newdeny mode highlights the packets
that are blocked by the modified policy but allowed by the original one. The
newallow mode is the opposite.
Liu et al. [88] and [89] propose to reduce configuration errors by forcing
network administrators to write two separate concrete configurations and to
compare them afterwards. The two configurations are converted into two
FDDs and the comparison is performed onto the two FDDs. The comparison
algorithm merges the two FDDs and verifies that the action, contained in the
leaves of the tree, is the same at each point. Possible anomalies found in the
two FDDs must be corrected manually by the administrators and without any
correlation to the original configurations. This approach can be generalized
and the two input policies may be seen as the original and the modified policy.
Liu et al. have also published two papers on change-impact analysis of
firewall policies [90, 91], their algorithm is based on a FDD and supports the
classic 5-tuple filtering rules. Overlapping rules are eliminated during the
creation of the FDD and as a result the FDD represents a filtering policy
without overlapping rules. The algorithm is designed to support four basic
operations on firewall policies: rule deletion, rule insertion, rule modification,
and rule swap. The output of the algorithm presents an accurate impact of a
proposed change. Furthermore, the algorithm is also capable of correlating the
impact of a policy change with a high-level security requirement. Although the
authors claim that the algorithm is practical, neither of the two papers does a
performance evaluation of the presented algorithms.
Yin and Bhuvaneswaran [92] represent correlations between rules as spatial
relations and show how this special relations can be used to evaluate the impact
of rule changes on the policy. Filtering policies are represented by the so-called
SIERRA tree. A SIERRA tree is similar to a FDD, each level of the tree
represents a dimension of the special division. The impact analysis can only
be performed on single changes, such as adding, removing or replacing rules.
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The performance of the algorithm is very poor since to calculate the difference
between two policies containing 30 rules takes several seconds.
Uribe et al. [93] propose a model for comparing a desired network security
policy with configurations of a network containing packet filters and NIDS. The
model verifies if the desired policy is correctly enforced.
The Margrave Tool by Nelson et al. [81] can perform change impact
analysis of single firewall configurations. The tool can compare a modified
configuration with the original one and returns the packet headers which are
treated differently.
Ben Youssef et al. [94] propose a formal and automatic verification method
based on a inference system. The solutions certify that a firewall configuration is
sound and respect completely to a security policy. In case that the configuration
is not sound and complete, the method provides the user with information to
solve the issues. This paper only supports packet filter firewalls; however in an
extended version [95], Youssef et al. propose a formal and automatic method
to check also stateful firewall configurations.
Krombi et al. [49] propose a procedure that synthesizes an automaton which
implements a given security policy. They use an automata-based approach to
develop, in firewall policy, three analysis procedures to verify completeness,
detect anomalies and functional discrepancies between several implementations
of a security policy.
3.3.2 Summary of State of the Art and Research Direc-
tions
Table 3.4 shows that the major part of the considered works face the comparison
between packet filter policies, while a scarce number of those comparisons
consider also stateful firewall policies and IPsec policies.
As it was mentioned before, the change impact analysis and implementation
verification can be carried out during a policy comparison. Although the imple-
mentation of both aspects could make the policy comparison more complete,
none seems to use both in the same work. Even if the whole literature presents
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a prototype of the proposed solution, only few of those policy comparison
prototypes have been validated into real use cases.
In summary, we think that the research is only at the beginning and much
more improvements can be introduced there.
Data Policy Type Features Validation
Y AUT CIT PKF IPsec APF CHN IMPL PRT TST EMP THEO
[86] 1997 Guttman 63 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[87] 2005 Guttman 30 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[7] 2001 Fu 29 ✓ ✓ ✓
[73] 2003 Hazelhurst 60 ✓ ✓ ✓
[88] 2004 Liu 29 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[90] 2007 Liu 6 ✓ ✓
[89] 2008 Liu 66 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[91] 2012 Liu 5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[92] 2006 Yin 4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[93] 2007 Uribe 27 ✓ ✓ ✓
[94] 2009 Ben Youssef 5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
[95] 2011 Ben Youssef 4 ✓ ✓ ✓
[49] 2014 Krombi 2 ✓ ✓
Y= Year; AUT= Author (reference author); CIT= Citation numbers (scopus and/or scholar); PKF=Packet
Filter; SFF= Stateful Firewall; CHN= Change Impact Analysis; IMPL= Implementation Analysis; PRT=
Prototype; TST= Test; EMP= Empirical evaluation; THE= Theoretical validation
Table 3.4 Summary of state of the art in Policy Comparison
Chapter 4
Network Security Policy:
Contributions
Anomalies in the network security configurations may result in serious breaches
and vulnerability causing problems such as blocking legitimate traffic, permit-
ting unwanted traffic and sending insecure data. Therefore we need a Policy
Anomaly Analysis, in order to identify potential errors, conflict and redundancy
among policy rules.
Although the literature has proposed several works and techniques to identify
anomalies, it is mainly focused on Intra- and Inter-policy analysis. The Intra-
Policy analysis identifies any anomaly in the rules of a single policy, while the
Inter-Policy analysis identifies anomalies in rules of a set of interconnected
policies.
Those works have been carried on in different policy application domains:
communication protection, filtering, traffic flow policy and others. Unfortu-
nately, such works have not been applied into the real activities of a network
administrator, as well as the major part of them generally is limited to a specific
policy domain.
For this reason, our contribution to the state-of-the-art is the definition
of innovative anomaly analysis for network security policy based on two new
classes of policy anomaly: Inter-technology and Inter-domain.
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The Inter-technology Policy Analysis identifies any anomaly in a set of
policies of different security communication technologies (e.g. IPsec, TLS, SSH).
For instance, when an IPsec tunnel encapsulates other TLS tunnels, the external
tunnel is a redundant level of protection.
The Inter-domain Policy Analysis identifies anomalies among policies of
different domains. This is the case of a firewall that blocks some encrypted
communication channels created by a VPN functionality, which generates an
Inter-domain anomaly between the filtering domain (i.e. the firewall) and the
communication-protection one (i.e. the VPN).
Inter-domain
Inter-technology
Inter-policy
Intra-policy
Intra-rule
novel
literature
Fig. 4.1 Policy Analysis Classes.
We divide the rest of this thesis in two parts: the first part focuses on
the communication protection policy analysis, where we develop a model of
communication protection policy, used in an Inter-technology analysis where
many network security technologies have been considered; while the second
part presents a Unified Model for Policy Analysis (UMPA) that embraces the
analysis model applied into single policy domain into a comprehensive analysis
of anomalies among many policy domains (i.e. Inter-domain anomaly analysis).
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4.1 Inter-technology analysis of communication
protection policies
In this part of the thesis, we pushed forward the state-of-the-art in several
directions.
The main contribution is the identification of nineteen types of anomalies
that may happen when implementing a Communication Protection Policy
(CPP). Six anomaly types are already known [57], but all the others are our
original contribution.
Anomalies are detected by means of a formal model that takes as input the
network description, nodes information and, the security controls’ configurations
and the communications to secure (during a CPP design validation) or the
communications actually secured (during a CPP implementation analysis).
Information in input become part of a knowledge base explored with a set of FOL
formulas to identify and report the detected anomalies to the administrators.
Anomalies have been categorized according to two different classifications:
an effect-based taxonomy and an information-centric one. The first classification
divides the anomalies describing the effects that they have on the network,
while the second one is based on the information needed to be analysed for
detecting the anomalies.
Having introduced several novel kinds of anomalies, we posed ourselves
some questions regarding the impact of our work. First of all, we have to
evaluate the effects of the detection of such new anomalies in improving the
security of the current IT infrastructures. We have to also understand if the
newly-introduced anomalies may be really generated by the administrators
during the configuration phase and, in case it is, we have to evaluate the costs
to detect such anomalies in large networks.
In order to answer the first question, for each anomaly we present the
possible consequences on the network and some ways to resolve it for reducing
the security impacts on the short and long period.
To answer the second question, we have prepared an empirical experiment
where three categories of administrators (experts, intermediate and beginners)
42 Network Security Policy: Contributions
were asked to configure a set of CPPs in a sample network. We show how
several of the newly introduced anomalies appear.
And finally, to answer the last question, we implemented, and tested in
several different scenarios, a tool making use of DL (description logic) ontologies
and custom Java-based reasoning rules.
4.2 Definition of Unified Model for Policy Anal-
ysis
Our contribution is to define a unified formal model for detecting network
conflicts and irregularities by defining Inter- and Intra-domain policy anomalies,
in order to avoid erroneous and unexpected network behaviours.
In particular, we design a model that is general enough to collect under its
umbrella different types of network policies, and exploits a medium-level policy
representation, named Policy Implementation (PI ).
A medium-level representation avoids network administrators to use vendor-
specific and implementation-dependent interfaces, required by a given security
control.
Let us consider the case of two firewalls provided by the same vendor that
support different configuration methods, for example the SNMP protocol for
the first firewall and the command line interface (CLI) for the latter. In this
case, an administrator should detect configuration errors and anomalies on his
firewalls by checking manually functions configurations. This implies that the
administrator has a deep knowledge about the two firewalls, the supported
methods of configuration and the ways to get the installed configuration in
order to check it and, in case of errors, fix it.
Here, an automatic translation of the low-level configuration of a net-
work function into a set of PIs may improve the anomaly analysis making it
implementation-independent and easier. However, this thesis is mostly related
to the definition of the analysis approach, thus we leave this translation as
future work.
In addition, this medium-level policy analysis can be added to a process of
policy refinement. In this way, we can reduce the anomalies deriving from the
refinement process itself, and produce final configurations that are anomaly-free.
In summary, the PI representation facilitates the analysis of network and
security configuration through a top-down approach, starting from high-level
policies to low-level anomaly-free configurations. In addition, it could also
enable an anomaly verification process that uses a bottom-up approach by
translating the low-level configurations into PIs.
The PI-based analysis model is composed by three parts: (i) the definition
of a hierarchical structure for the PIs to identify the relations between network
policies; (ii) an anomaly classification to specify which set of policy conditions
imply an anomaly; (iii) anomaly detection rules to identify when a certain
network policy anomaly occurs. Those components are described in detail in
this part of the thesis.
Finally in order to validate the generality of this solution, we considered
three case studies to be mapped into the model. We have selected a case-study
already known in the literature, that is the filtering policy, a new example of
security policies like the communication protection one and finally a novel case
of non-security-related policies, which are the traffic flow policies.

Communication Protection
Policies

Chapter 5
Communication Protection
Policies: Modelling and Analysis
As defined in Chapter 2, Communication Protection Policies (CPPs) allow
the definition of how to make the network communications secure in critical
contexts, like financial or corporate.
Several proposals have been presented in literature for detecting CPP
conflicts, but most of them focus only on a single security technology (i.e.
IPSec) and overlook the effects of multiple overlapping protection techniques
(see Chapter 3).
In this chapter, we present a novel classification of communication protec-
tion policy anomalies and a formal model which is able to detect anomalies.
The result of our analysis allows administrators to have a precise insight on
the various alternative implementations, their relations and the possibility of
resolving anomalies, thus increasing the overall security and performance of a
network.
5.1 Background
In this section, we briefly introduce the main concepts and terms that we will
use throughout the rest of the work.
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A communication is any directional data exchange between two network
entities. A secure communication is a communication ‘adequately’ protected,
that is, it fully satisfies a set of security requirements. In this context, the se-
curity requirements concern three security properties: header integrity, payload
integrity and (payload) confidentiality.
A channel is directional data exchange between two nodes protected with
some security properties (a secure channel) or none (an insecure channel).
Logically, a secure channel is an association between a source node, where
the security properties are applied, and a destination node where the security
properties are removed or verified. A communication can be thought as a
stack of several (secure and/or insecure) channels. For example, an end-to-
end TLS communication consists of a single secure channel. More complex
scenarios exist, however. For instance, a communication between two hosts in
two separated networks connected with an IPsec site-to-site VPN is modelled
with two channels: an insecure one between the end-points and an IPsec secure
channel between the VPN terminators.
In the real world, the secure communications are defined by using a set of
configuration settings containing several low-level details. For instance, the
configuration of a TLS server contains detailed information about the supported
cipher-suites. During the design and policy analysis phases, however, this level
of granularity is usually not needed. For our purposes, a secure channel can be
represented by specifying:
1. the source and destination entities (they can be network nodes or direct
references to an entity lying at a particular OSI layer such IP addresses
and URIs);
2. the security protocol to use (our model can be easily extended to new
protocols and can support a wide array of technologies at different OSI
layers);
3. the required security properties;
4. the crossed gateways and the traffic to protect (meaningful only in case
of tunnels).
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We name policy implementation (or PI for short) this formal representation of
a channel. Note that since a channel is directional, a PI is directional too. This
means that, to create a complete request-reply connection, we need at least
two PIs. We call a PI set a group of policy implementations that belongs to
the same node and use the same technology. For instance, a particular server
supporting IPsec and SSH will have two PI sets, one for each protocol. We will
assume without loss of generality that the policy implementations in the same
PI set are ordered according to their priority
Note that to perform our analysis, we will make use of other additional
sources of information such as:
• network reachability data, as the configurations of filtering controls and
NAT devices must be available to determine if the channels can be actually
established (e.g. to check if a channel is not dropped by a firewall);
• supported security protocols (at various OSI levels), for guaranteeing that
it is possible to establish the secure channels;
• supported cryptographic algorithms, as some cipher-suites might not be
available when actually deploying a PI on the installed security controls.
Finally, we will refer to the network topology as a graph where its nodes are
potential channel end-points (both sources and destinations) and its edges are
physical or virtual connections between them.
5.2 Motivating example
Before formally tackling the analysis of the PI anomalies, we will begin our
discussion by considering the simplified network scenario presented in Fig. 5.1.
The diagram shows a main corporate network (C) and two branch networks
(A and B). The three networks are connected through the Internet and consist
of a number of security gateways (denoted by the letter g) that mediate the
communications between servers (sc1 and sc2) and clients (indicated by the
symbol c). Server sc1 hosts two services (web1 and db), while sc2 hosts only one
web service (web2).
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From now on, we use the informal notation s t−−→
pi,c
d to indicate a PI that
establishes a channel from the source s to the destination d using the technology
t to enforce some security properties. In this simplified example we will only
take into account two security properties, (payload) confidentiality and payload
integrity, denoted by the symbols c and pi, respectively. For instance, the PI
a
IPsec−−−→
pi
b indicates an IPsec connection with integrity (but not confidentiality),
from a to b.
For the sake of clarity, in this example we present the communication
protection policy anomaly using the effect-based taxonomy. As shown in
Fig. 5.2, this classification divides the anomalies into five macro-categories:
1) insecure communications; 2) unfeasible communications; 3) potential errors;
4) suboptimal communications; 5) suboptimal walks.
These macro-categories will be briefly described in the following paragraphs.
Internet
ga1ca2
ca1
ca3
gb1
cb1
cb2
gb2
gc1
gc3
gc2
sc1
sc2
db
web1
cc2
web2
cc1
cc3
A
B
C
Fig. 5.1 A simplified network scenario.
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Fig. 5.2 Effect-based taxonomy of CPPs.
5.2.1 Insecure communications
An insecure communication occurs when communication security level is lower
than the expected one. For instance, we can have a channel that does not satisfy
the minimum security level, e.g. specified in the corporate policy, thus creating
an inadequacy anomaly. For example, we may observe such anomaly when the
IT managers require that ‘all the data crossing Internet must be encrypted’
and a security administrator creates the policy implementation ca1 TLS−−→{pi} sc1.
Another case of insecure communication arises when the security require-
ments are respected but the communications consist of more than one channel
(e.g. remote access). Here, the nodes at the channel junctions can ‘see’ the
exchanged data, thus lowering connection security and creating a monitorability
anomaly (Fig. 5.3). For instance, the PIs sc1 IPsec−−−→{c,pi} gc1 and gc1
IPsec−−−→
{c,pi}
ca1 create
a sort of logical communication between sc1 and ca1 composed of a sequence of
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two channels interconnected through gc1. This means that, even if everything
is encrypted, gc1 reads the payload since it decrypts and encrypts again the
exchanged data.
sc1 gc1 ca1
tunnel
Fig. 5.3 Diagram of the monitorability between sc1, gc1, ca1.
Another kind of insecure communication, - more subtle but potentially
catastrophic- can occur with a wrong tunnel overlapping that removes the
confidentiality in a part of the communication and produces a skewed channel
anomaly (a super-set of Al-Shaer’s overlapping anomalies [57]). For example, a
security administrator can create a tunnel gc3 IPsec−−−→{c} ga1 and another one with
gc3
IPsec−−−→
{c}
gc1 (note that the latter tunnel is ‘included’ in the first one). The
trellis diagram in Fig. 5.4 helps to graphically visualize the problem.
gc3 gc1 ga1
Double tunnel
Single tunnel
No tunnel
Fig. 5.4 Diagram of the skewed channel between gc3, gc1, ga1.
When gc3 sends some data, it encapsulates the information in two tunnels.
Hence, when ga1 receives the data, it removes the external tunnel encapsulation
without removing, the internal one. Then, ga1 sends the data back to gc1 which,
in turn, removes the last tunnel. Finally, gc1 sends the data to ga1 with no
protection, thus exposing the communication content to a sniffing attacker.
In the real world, the majority of connections are bidirectional, since a
request usually requires a reply. It may occur that the request channel has a
different security level from the reply one, generating an asymmetric channel
anomaly. This is not necessarily an issue, but it could be useful to report this
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inconsistency to the administrators, so that they can check if security control
configurations reflect the intended network behaviour.
5.2.2 Unfeasible communications
An unfeasible communication is a communication that cannot be established
because of a hard misconfiguration. These anomalies are very severe since they
completely prevent any data exchange.
The simplest example of an unfeasible communication is when security
administrators design a PI with a technology that is not supported by an end-
point or with a security level that is too high to be enforced by the available
cipher-suites. This situation is defined as a non-enforceability anomaly. For
instance, the policy implementation web2 TLS−−→{c} db becomes non-enforceable if
the service administrators did not install TLS on sc2 (where web2 resides). This
PI must obviously be deployed on the source endpoint sc2. However, if the
node containing this PI is not sc2, we have generated a further issue: an out of
place anomaly.
We also have a hindered connection if the packets of a channel are dropped by
a firewall that lies on the path between source and destination, thus producing
a filtered channel anomaly.
Firewalls and bad server configurations are not the only causes of an unfea-
sible communication. There are also technological incompatibilities between
wired and wireless protocols when performing security at level 2 (data link)
of the ISO/OSI stack. For example, if we choose to create a secure channel
using WPA2 technology, we must be sure that the network frames only cross
wireless-enabled nodes. If one or more crossed nodes are wired-only, then we
have an L2 anomaly.
5.2.3 Potential errors
Potential errors form a class of anomalies where the original intent of the
administrators is unclear. Hence their solution requires a thorough human
inspection.
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When working with a large group of PIs, an administrator can create a
PI that meddles all the traffic of another PI with different security properties.
For instance, the PI ca1 TLS−−→{pi} web1 hides ca1
TLS−−→
{c}
web1, if the first one has a
higher priority. Since the former shadows the latter, such an anomaly is called
shadowing anomaly, while when the second PI has a higher priority, we have
an exception anomaly. Exceptions are useful and are typically exploited by
administrators to express an ‘all but one’ rule, even though we report them for
verification.
Another kind of potential errors occurs when there are two PIs sharing the
same technology and the same source and destination on the same node. This
situation can lead to an ambiguity, since sometimes a piece of data can match
multiple PIs, hence making the intended protection level unclear. For example,
web2
TLS−−→
{c}
sc1 and sc2 TLS−−→{c,pi} db are ambiguous, for a packet from web2 to db can
match both PIs. This problem is a correlation anomaly. Similarly, there will
be an affinity anomaly between two PIs using different technologies but having
source and destination on the same nodes.
Finally, we have a contradiction anomaly when two PIs respectively express
that the same communication should be protected and unprotected. For
instance, let suppose that an IT manager defines a policy where ‘all the
traffic for the Internet must be inspected’ and a security manager enforces the
encryption of the traffic exchanged between ca1 and sc1 via the PI ca1 IPsec−−−→{c,pi} sc1.
This leads to a contradiction, since the policy requires that the data for the
Internet should be monitorable, while PI encrypts them.
5.2.4 Suboptimal implementations
Suboptimal implementations arise when one or more PIs can decrease the
network throughput by producing some overhead in the nodes. Their existence
is not usually problematic, but their solution can be beneficial, since it improves
network performance and makes the PIs less vulnerable to DoS attacks.
The simplest kind of suboptimal implementations occurs when an adminis-
trator deploys a PI that makes another PI useless, as the first one can secure
the communication at the same, or at a higher level than the second one, with a
more effective protection (e.g. stronger encryption). For example, two different
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security administrators may have independently defined the PIs ca1 TLS−−→{c} web1
and ca1 IPsec−−−→{c,pi} sc1. The former is included in the latter, so that it can be safely
removed. In these cases, we may observe a redundancy anomaly if both the
PIs use the same technology, or an inclusion anomaly if they use two different
protocols.
Another type of suboptimality arises when a tunnel encapsulates other
tunnels with a higher security level. This is a superfluous anomaly and can be
resolved by simply deleting the external, redundant tunnel.
There may also be some channels that can be safely removed without
altering the network semantic. This happens in the so called internal loop
anomalies, where a PI source and destination belong to the same node.
5.2.5 Suboptimal walks
A group of PIs can produce a suboptimal walk when the path taken by the data
is unnecessarily long.
In large networks, a communication between two end-points can take multi-
ple paths, thus generating an alternative path anomaly. They are not necessarily
a misconfiguration, but we can detect and report them to the administrators
as a safety measure. For example, gc2 IPsec−−−→{c} gc3 forms an alternative path w.r.t.
gc2
IPsec−−−→
{c}
gc1 and gc1 IPsec−−−→{c} gc3.
Another cause of suboptimality occurs when some data cross a node multiple
times during their travel. This cyclic path anomaly can be removed by deleting
the cycles, thus shortening the network path.
5.3 PI hierarchical structure
In this section, we will formally define what a policy implementation is, as
well as defining its structure and the relationships between the various network
fields that compose it. In addition, we will also describe the notion of path,
which is used to detect several kind of network anomalies.
54 Communication Protection Policies: Modelling and Analysis
In our model, a PI i is a tuple:
i = (s, d, t, C, S,G)
Where:
• s and d respectively represent the channel source and the destination
(Section 5.3.1);
• t is the security technology adopted (Section 5.3.2);
• C is an ordered set of coefficients that indicate the security levels required
(Section 5.3.3);
• S is a selector, i.e. a tuple of network fields, used to identify the traffic
that needs to be protected (Section 5.3.4);
• G is the list of the gateways involved in the communication (Section 5.3.5).
5.3.1 Sources (s) and destinations (d)
sc1
2
3
5 5′
7′
(a) Representation of sc1.
ga1
2
3
2′
3′
(b) Representation of ga1.
Fig. 5.5 Graphical representation of a server and a gateway.
To perform an accurate detection of anomalies, it is necessary to identify
the layer in the OSI stack where a secure communication starts and terminates.
To this purpose, we use a hierarchical structure that represents the points
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where the secure communication end-points can be established. This structure
has an elementary tree-like graphical representation as shown in Fig. 5.5.
The root represents the network node itself, while all the tree nodes model
the available network entities in the OSI stack. In this paper we will only
focus our attention on the data link, network, session and application layers.
The tree levels may also be associated respectively to the layer 2 addresses,
IP addresses, port numbers and URIs. To avoid ambiguity, we will use the
notation sc1.l5′ to specify the node labeled 5′ in the sc1 tree and so on.
Note that the gateways expose multiple interfaces, one for each network
where they are connected to. For instance, in Fig. 5.5b, we have two vertices at
layer 3 that represent the ‘internal’ interface for the network A and an ‘external’
interface for the Internet. If a gateway supports also VPNs creation via TLS
tunnels (e.g. OpenVPN), we will have two additional vertexes at the session
level.
Given any two network entities e1 and e2, we define the following relation-
ships:
• e1 is equivalent to e2 (e1 = e2) if they are exactly the same entity;
• e1 dominates e2 (e1 ≻ e2) if all the traffic starting from (or arriving to) e2
passes through e1. Graphically, that means that e1 is an ancestor of e2 in
the tree representation. This concept is particularly useful when dealing
with security protocols working at different OSI layers. In Fig. 5.5a, for
instance sc1.l3 dominates sc1.l7′.
• e1 is a kin of e2 (e1 ∼ e2) if e1 and e2 belong to the same network node,
but there is no equivalence or dominance relationship amongst them. For
example, in Fig. 5.5a, sc1.l5 is a kin of sc1.l5′.
• e1 and e2 are disjoint (e1 ⊥ e2) if they belong to different network nodes
(and hence trees).
Note that if e1 and e2 are not disjoint (e1 ̸⊥ e2) , it means that they are
on the same device. Hence, they are related by an equivalence, dominance or
kinship relationship.
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5.3.2 Technologies (t)
In this thesis, we take into account a limited set of technologies. Nonetheless, our
model is flexible enough to accommodate any security protocol. In particular,
we will only consider:
• the data link layer: WPA2 and 802.1AE MACsec;
• the network layer: IPsec;
• the session layer: TLS1;
• the application layer: WS-Security and SSH.
In addition, we also use the special NULL technology, to indicate that a
communication should be created without any kind of protection.
Similarly to network entities, two technologies t1 and t2 can have different
relationships:
• t1 is equivalent to t2 (t1 = t2), if they are exactly the same technology;
• t1 dominates t2 (t1 ≻ t2) if the OSI layer of t1 is strictly lower than the t2’s
one. The NULL technology is dominated by all the other technologies.
• t1 is a kin of t2 (t1 ∼ t2) if t1 and t2 are different and they work at the
same OSI layer;
• t1 is disjoint from t2 (t1 ⊥ t2) if one technology is NULL and the other
one is not NULL.
In general, the following relationships hold:
t(i) ∼ t′(i), t(i) ̸= t′(i)
t(2) ≻ t(3) ≻ t(5) ≻ t(7)
t ⊥ NULL, ∀t ̸= NULL
1Protections at transport layer, such as TLS, are sometimes associated to the session layer
as they work on top of the TCP/UDP protocols. We do not want to enter a philosophical
diatribe as, for our purposes, the important thing is the order of encapsulation of the different
protections.
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Where t(i) represents a technology at the OSI level i.
5.3.3 Security coefficients (C)
The set of security coefficients consists of several non-negative real values
that indicate a required security level for a specific property. The higher a
value, the stronger the enforcement of a property should be. On the other
hand, if a coefficient is zero the related security property must not be enforced.
Obviously, if the chosen technology is NULL, all the coefficients are zero. These
values should be estimated by the administrators with the use of some metrics,
for example on the chosen cipher-suite (taking into account the key length,
encryption/hash algorithms and cipher mode).
In this thesis, we only focus our attention on three properties, which are
header integrity (chi), payload integrity (cpi) and (payload) confidentiality (cc),
so that:
C = (chi, cpi, cc)
The relationships amongst two coefficient sets C1 and C2 are:
• C1 is equivalent to C2 (C1 = C2) if all the coefficients of C1 are the same
as their C2’s counterparts;
• C1 dominates C2 (C1 ≻ C2) if at lest one coefficient of C1 is strictly
greater than its C2’s counterparts and the other coefficients of C1 are not
lower than their C2’s counterparts;
• C1 is disjoint with C2 (C1 ⊥ C2) if there is neither dominance nor
equivalence between C1 and C2, that is C1 ̸≽ C2 ∧ C1 ̸≼ C2.
5.3.4 Selectors (S)
As presented in Chapter 2, some security protocols (e.g. IPsec, see RFC-
3585 [96]) allow the definition of filtering conditions to select the traffic that
must be protected. Our model supports such conditions via the selectors S of a
policy implementation, that are tuples of network fields. In theory (and in our
model too), S can be arbitrarily defined with any field, however, in practice,
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the fields in S are usually the well-known five-tuple consisting of a source IP
address (ipsrc) and port (psrc), a destination IP address (ipdst) and port (pdst)
and a protocol type (prt). We will assume this in the rest of the paper that S
at least includes the five-tuple, that is:
S = (ipsrc, ipdst, psrc, pdst, prt, . . .)
We will use the notation ←−S to indicate a reverse list of selectors where source
and destination are swapped, that is ←−S = (ipdst, ipsrc, pdst, psrc, prt, . . .).
In addition, we use the notation S|f1×f2×... to restrict the selector space
to the fields f1, f2, . . .. For instance, in the following sections, we will of-
ten use the more compact S|ipsrc×ipdst = (ipsrc, ipdst) instead of the n-tuple
(ipsrc, pdst, ∗, ∗, ∗, . . . ) (where the asterisk symbol ∗ will denote a field matched
by any value) to define a selector that matches all the traffic from ipsrc to ipdst
regardless of the port numbers and protocol. Moreover, the all-matching tuple
(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, . . . ) will be also shortened to a single ∗ inside a PI definition.
In addition, we will make use of the following relationships between the
selector tuples:
• S1 is equivalent to S2 (S1 = S2), if their selectors are exactly the same;
• S1 dominates S2 (S1 ≻ S2) if the matched traffic of S2 is a sub-set of the
matched traffic of S1;
• S1 is a kin to S2 (S1 ∼ S2) if there is at least one communication that
matches S1 but not S2 and vice-versa;
• S1 is disjoint from S2 (S1 ⊥ S2) if the sets of the traffic matched by S1
and S2 are disjoint.
5.3.5 Crossed gateways (G)
Tunnel PIs contain an ordered set G that specifies the gateways crossed by
the channel traffic. The G set of tunnel PIs is statically computed from the
network topology and the content of the routing tables.
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Note that the list of crossed gateways does not contain the channel source
and destination nodes. We use the notation G∗ to indicate a list containing
also the PI end-points, that is G∗ = {s} ∪G∪ {d}. We will also denote the list
of crossed gateways in reverse order with ←−G .
It is worth presenting an example of PIs that use gateways. Given the
network in Fig. 5.1, a communication from ca1 to sc1 that passes into an IPsec
tunnel between the two gateways ga1 and gc2 is implemented by two PIs:
i1 = (ca1, sc1,NULL, (0, 0, 0), ∗, (ga1, gc1, gc2))
i2 = (ga1, gc2, IPsec, (3, 3, 3), ipca1 , ∗, ipsc1 , ∗, ∗), (gc1))
where i1 specifies the communication that will be encapsulated in the tunnel
defined by i2.
5.3.6 Paths
We introduce now the concept of path, which is strictly related to the notion of
policy implementation. The notation P e1,en represents a possible path starting
from the network entity e1 and terminating into the network entity en. Each
path is a list of policy implementations (i1, i2, . . . , in) where: (i) the source of
the first PI i1 is e1; (ii) the destination of the last PI in is en; (iii) given two
consecutive PIs in the path ij and ij+1, the property dj ∈ Sj+1 holds.
For instance, a path from cc2 to sc2 can be implemented by:
i1 = (cc2, gc3,NULL, (0, 0, 0), ∗,∅)
i2 = (gc3, gc2, IPsec, (3, 3, 3), (subnetcc , ∗, subnetcs , ∗, ∗),∅)
i3 = (gc2, sc2,NULL, (0, 0, 0), ∗,∅)
Since P e1,en is a set, we will use the notation |P e1,e2 | to indicate its cardinality,
that is the number of policy implementations that compose it.
Note that two paths P e1,en1 and P e1,en2 are different (P e1,en1 ̸= P e1,en2 ) if they
differ by at least one element and/or if their respective PIs are placed in different
orders.
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Fig. 5.6 Information-centric taxonomy of CPPs.
5.4 Anomaly analysis and resolution
Having formalized the definition of a policy implementation, we express the
logic formulas used to detect the various anomalies.
In Section 5, we introduced an anomaly classification - which emphasizes
the side effects of an anomaly- based on five macro-categories (Fig. 5.2). In the
following paragraphs, however, we will adopt a more technical classification
(Fig. 5.6), which suits better for a formal discussion. As a matter of fact, such
a classification highlights the possible levels of interactions among PIs and,
hence, at which level it is possible to generate an anomaly.
We distinguish three levels of anomalies: 1) the PI level anomalies that
occur within a single PI; 2) the node level anomalies, which come up between
two distinct PIs placed on the same node; 3) the network level anomalies
arising between distinct PIs that belong to different nodes.
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5.4.1 PI level anomalies
We can distinguish two families of PI level anomalies: irrelevant and unsuitable
requirement anomalies. A PI that generates an irrelevant anomaly (internal
loop and out of place) is meaningless for the network semantics, so that
their presence does not change how network exchange data. The unsuitable
requirement anomalies (non-enforceability and inadequacy), instead, break
some security requisite and can lead to severe problems.
Internal loop – Ail(i1)
An internal loop anomaly occurs when source and destination end-points are
on the same node, thus creating a data loop. These anomalies can be inferred
using the formula:
Ail(i1)⇔ s1 ̸⊥ d1
The resolution method proposed is to simply delete i1.
Out of place – Aop(i1)
An out of place anomaly consists of a PI deployment on a wrong network node,
which means that the source is disjoint with the node where the PI is deployed.
In order to detect these anomalies, we use the function N (i1) that returns the
node where the PI is actually deployed. The formula is then:
Aop(i1)⇔ N (i1) ⊥ s1
The simplest resolution is to delete i1. However, a more suitable approach can
be to redeploy the PI on the correct node or to appropriately modify its source.
Non-enforceability – Ane(i1)
A PI i1 is non-enforceable when its technology is not supported by the source,
the destination or when its security coefficients are ‘too high’, and hence cannot
be enforced.
62 Communication Protection Policies: Modelling and Analysis
We will make use of two functions: T (e), which returns the set of technologies
supported by the node e, and Cmax(i1), which returns the set of maximum
enforceable coefficients by the PI i1.
These anomalies can be identified with the formula:
Ane(i1)⇔ C1 ≻ Cmax(i1) ∨ t1 ̸∈ T (s1) ∨ t1 ̸∈ T (d1)
To solve such anomalies an administrator can choose to upgrade the security
libraries/services on the PI source/destination to support the desired tech-
nologies or, alternatively, he might modify the PI by changing the protocol or
lowering the security coefficients.
Inadequacy – Ain(i1)
We have an inadequacy anomaly when the security coefficients of a policy
implementation establish a channel lower than an acceptable threshold. We
can use a function Cmin(i1) that returns the minimum acceptable coefficients
for the channel defined by the PI i1. This function should be defined a priori
by the administrators according to some sort of metric or best practice [97–99].
For example, a network administrator could define a function such as:
Cmin(i1) =
⟨1, 1, 1⟩ if i1 is crossing the Internet⟨0, 0, 0⟩ otherwise
We can detect these anomalies with the rule:
Ain(i1)⇔ C1 ≺ Cmin(i1)
In order to fix these issues, security requirements of policy implementation
must be increased so that the property C1 ≽ Cmin(i1) holds.
5.4.2 Node level anomalies
A node level anomaly occurs between two distinct policy implementations lying
on the same node.
5.4 Anomaly analysis and resolution 63
If the two PIs share the same technology then we have an Intra-technology
anomaly (shadowing, exception, redundancy and correlation anomalies). Other-
wise, there will be an Inter-technology anomaly (inclusion, affinity and contra-
diction anomalies). The Intra-technology anomaly category has been heavily
inspired by the work of Al-shaer et al. [57].
For detecting these anomalies, we assume that the two PIs have the same
crossed gateways, i.e. G1 = G2. In addition, we will also make use of the
function π(i) ∈ N that returns the priority of a PI in a PI set (the lower the
number the higher the priority).
Shadowing – Ash(i1, i2)
A PI i2 is shadowed when there is another policy implementation i1 with a higher
priority that matches all the traffic of the first one (s1 ≽ s2∧d1 ≽ d2∧S1 ≽ S2)
and has disjoint security coefficients. We can detect these anomalies using the
formula:
Ash(i1, i2)⇔ π(i1) < π(i2) ∧ t1 = t2 ∧ s1 ≽ s2∧
∧d1 ≽ d2 ∧ S1 ≽ S2 ∧ C1 ⊥ C2 ∧G1 = G2 ∧ i1 ̸= i2
In order to solve these kinds of anomalies, the two PIs should be replaced by
another PI i3 that is a sort of upper bound of the previous ones. In particular,
i3 will be composed by the following fields:
• s3 is the least upper bound of s1 and s2, so that s3 ≽ s1 and s3 ≽ s2 hold;
• d3 is the least upper bound of d1 and d2,so that d3 ≽ d1 and d3 ≽ d2 hold;
• C3 = {c3,i}i can be computed as c3,i = max(c1,i, c2,i) where C1 = {c1,i}i
and C2 = {c2,i}i;
• S3 is the least upper bound of S1 and S2 such that S3 ≽ S1 and S3 ≽ S2
hold;
• t3 = t1 = t2, G3 = G1 = G2.
To maintain the semantics of the system, the new PI i3 should be inserted
with the same priority of i1 (that is π(i1)).
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Redundancy – Are(i1, i2)
A PI i2 is redundant when there is another policy implementation i1 with a
higher priority that matches all the traffic of the first one and its security
coefficients are equal to or dominate the other PI’s coefficients. The following
formula can be used to infer these problems:
Are(i1, i2)⇔ t1 = t2 ∧ s1 ≽ s2 ∧ d1 ≽ d2
∧S1 ≽ S2 ∧ C1 ≽ C2 ∧G1 = G2 ∧ i1 ̸= i2
The proposed resolution consists of simply deleting i2, since it does not add
any new semantics to the policy.
Exception – Aex(i1, i2)
A PI i2 is an exception of another policy implementation i1 with a higher
priority if they have disjoint security coefficients and i2 is a superset match of
i1 (s1 ≺ s2 ∧ d1 ≺ d2 ∧ S1 ⊃ S2) . The corresponding detection formula is:
Aex(i1, i2)⇔ π(i1) ≺ π(i2) ∧ t1 = t2 ∧ s1 ≺ s2∧
∧d1 ≺ d2 ∧ S1 ≺ S2 ∧ C1 ⊥ C2 ∧G1 = G2 ∧ i1 ̸= i2
Exceptions are analogous to shadowing anomalies (just the opposite order of
precedences), indeed, they share the same solution technique.
Correlation – Aco(i1, i2)
A PI i2 is correlated with another policy implementation i1 if they have disjoint
security coefficients, i1 matches some traffic for i2 and vice versa. In other
words, i1 and i2 source and destination belong to the same node and there
is no other Intra-technology anomaly between policy implementations (i.e.
shadowing, redundancy or exception). We can detect these anomalies via the
formula:
Aco(i1, i2)⇔ s1 ̸⊥ s2 ∧ d1 ̸⊥ d2 ∧ t1 = t2 ∧ S1 ̸⊥ S2
∧G1 = G2 ∧ ¬Ash(i1, i2) ∧ ¬Aex(i1, i2) ∧ ¬Are(i1, i2) ∧ i1 ̸= i2
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To solve these anomalies, the two PIs i1 and i2 can be replaced with a new
PI i3 with the same fields as described in the shadowing anomaly resolution
technique. However, the newly created policy implementation will be inserted
with a priority π(i3) = min(π(i1), π(i2)).
Inclusion – Ain(i1, i2)
The PI i1 includes (or dominates) the policy implementation i2 when all fields
of i1 dominate or are equal to their respective i2 fields, with the exception of
one that is strictly dominant. We can detect these anomalies with the formula:
Ain(i1, i2)⇔ s1 ≽ s2 ∧ d1 ≽ d2 ∧ t1 ≽ t2∧
∧C1 ≽ C2 ∧ S1 ≽ S2 ∧G1 = G2 ∧ i1 ̸= i2
The simplest way to solve these anomalies is to delete i2 (the ‘innermost’
PI). Though , an administrator can also choose to keep both the policy imple-
mentations, by adopting a security in depth approach.
Affinity – Aaf (i1, i2)
A PI i1 is affine with another policy implementation i2 when they share some
fields, but none of the PIs include the other. We can detect these anomalies
with the formula:
Aaf (i1, i2)⇔ (s1 ̸⊥ s2 ∧ d1 ̸⊥ d2 ∧ t1 ̸⊥ t2)∧
S1 ̸⊥ S2 ∧ ¬Ain(i1, i2) ∧ ¬Ain(i2, i1) ∧ i1 ̸= i2
To solve this type of anomalies, a possible solution may be to replace the
two PIs should be replaced with a new PI i3 that is a sort of upper bound of
the previous ones:
• s3 is the least upper bound of s1 and s2 so that s3 ≽ s1 and s3 ≽ s2 hold;
• d3 is the least upper bound of d1 and d2 so that d3 ≽ d1 and d3 ≽ d2
hold;
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• t3 is the least upper bound of t1 and t2 so that t3 ≽ t1 and t3 ≽ t2 hold;
• C3 = {c3,i}i can be computed as c3,i = max(c1,i, c2,i) where C1 = {c1,i}i
and C2 = {c2,i}i;
• S3 is the least upper bound of S1 and S2 such that S3 ≽ S1 and S3 ≽ S2
hold;
• G3 = G1 = G2 .
Contradiction – Aco(i1, i2)
Two PIs i1 and i2 are in contradiction if their sources/destinations lay on the
same node while their technologies are disjoint (that is one PI is using the
NULL technology and the other one a security protocol). The formula for
detecting these anomalies is:
Aco(i1, i2)⇔ s1 ̸⊥ s2 ∧ d1 ̸⊥ d2 ∧ t1 ⊥ t2 ∧ S1 ̸⊥ S2 ∧ i1 ̸= i2
Due to the high ambiguity of the situation (we cannot distinguish between a
‘protect’ and a ‘do not protect’ requirement), the resolution may be the removal
of one policy implementation, for instance, the one using the NULL technology.
5.4.3 Network level anomalies
Network level anomalies occur between distinct PIs that belong to different
nodes. We can split these anomalies into two main categories: path (cyclic
path, monitorability and alternative path anomalies), and channel anomalies
(superfluous, filtered channel, L2, skewed channel and asymmetric channel
anomalies).
Superfluous – Asu(i1)
A PI i1 is superfluous if it models a tunnel that protects less than all its inner end-
to-end channels. That is, the security coefficient of a superfluous tunnel i1 are
smaller than all the encapsulated channels (∀ ik : sk ∈ S1|ipsrc×psrc×...∧G∗k ⊃ G∗1).
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This anomalous PIs can be detected by using the formula:
Asu(i1)⇔ @ ik : sk ∈ S1|ipsrc×psrc×... ∧G∗k ⊃ G∗1 ∧ Ck ≺ C1
Since all the data transported in the tunnel are better protected than the
tunnel itself, the obvious resolution is to delete i1 (since it is superfluous).
However, as in the inclusion anomaly, an administrator could choose to keep
the PI to (slightly) increase the security of the network.
Skewed channel – Ask(i1, i2)
Two PIs i1 and i2 that define two tunnels are skewed if their respective channels
overlap. This type of anomalies are tricky because the traffic will be sent
without any form of encryption in a portion of the network (Fig. 5.4). We can
detect these anomalies with the formula:
Ask(i1, i2)⇔ s1 ∈ S2|ipsrc×psrc×... ∧ (|G∗1 ∩G∗2|) > 2∧
∧(G∗2 \G∗1 ̸= 0) ∧ cc1 > 0 ∧ cc2 > 0 ∧ i1 ̸= i2
In order to solve this kind of anomalies, the two PIs must be split in three
(or more) non-overlapping policy implementations.
Filtered channel – Afi(i1)
A PI i1 is filtered when there exists at least one node e in its path with a
filtering rule that discards all its traffic. Given a function Fe(i1), which returns
true if the traffic related to i1 is dropped and false otherwise, we can formally
model this anomaly with:
Afi(i1)⇔ ∃e : e ∈ G1 ∧ Fe(i1) = true
In practice, the output of the function Fe(i1) can be populated either by
means of a network reachability analysis [78], [100] or by using some firewall
policy queries [61].
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This anomaly is particularly severe since it completely hinders the con-
nectivity among a number of network nodes. To remove the problem, the
administrator can choose to delete the PI i1 or to modify accordingly the
filtering rule.
L2- AL2(i1)
We have a L2 anomaly when a PI that uses a data-link layer technology crosses
an area using a different layer 2 protocol. For instance, we have a L2 anomaly
when a WPA2 policy implementation crosses some Ethernet nodes, so that we
cannot use WPA2 for the whole path. We can express this anomaly by using a
function T (2)(e) that returns the set of technologies at layer 2 supported by
the node e. We can then write the formula:
AL2(i1)⇔ ∃e : e ∈ G∗1 ∧ t1 ̸∈ T (2)(e)
These anomalies are rather hard to solve since they require a complete edit
of the PI, by choosing a technology at a layer that is strictly greater than 2.
Asymmetric channel – Aas(i1)
A PI i1 is asymmetric if no other PI exists with:
1. the source, destination and selectors swapped (s1 ̸⊥ d2∧d1 ̸⊥ s2∧S1 ̸⊥ ←−S2);
2. the same technology and security coefficients;
3. the same list of crossed gateways, which are instead in reverse order.
In other words, these problems arise when we have a bidirectional communi-
cation with a channel that is weaker than the other. We can identify these
anomalies by using the formula:
Aas(i1)⇔ @i2 : s1 ̸⊥ d2 ∧ d1 ̸⊥ s2 ∧ t1 = t2 ∧ C1 = C2 ∧ S1 ̸⊥ ←−S2 ∧G1 =←−G2
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The simplest way to solve these anomalies is to ensure that the two PIs have
the same security coefficients.2
Cyclic path – Acy(P e1,e2)
There is a cyclic path anomaly between two network nodes e1 and e2 if there is
at least one cycle in the path connecting them. In literature, several algorithms
have been proposed to perform cycle detection in graphs in an extremely
efficient way [101].
This kind of anomalies can be solved by modifying the PIs in order to
remove the cycles.
Monitorability – Amo(P e1,e2)
A path P e1,e2 is monitorable when there is not an end-to-end channel between e1
and e2, which means that, even if the connections are protected by encryption,
there is at least one node where an encrypt/decrypt operation is performed,
thus potentially breaking the confidentiality of the communication. These
anomalies can be detected by using the formula:
Amo(P e1,e2)⇔ @P e1,e2 : (|P e1,e2 | = 1 ∧ ij ∈ P e1,e2 : ccj > 0)
If the network is not trusted, the obvious way to remove the anomaly is to
edit the PIs, so that there are only end-to-end channels between e1 and e2 .
Alternative path – Aal(P e1,e21 , P e1,e22 )
There is an alternative path between two nodes e1 and e2 if there are two or
more different paths that can be taken from the source node to the destination
node. These anomalies can be easily found by using the formula:
Aal(P e1,e21 , P e1,e22 )⇔ ∃P e1,e21 , P e1,e22 : P e1,e21 ̸= P e1,e22
2Unless the administrator wants this configuration for his network and thus he indicates
that the encountered conditions is not a real anomaly.
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To remove such a redundancy, administrators have to choose the ‘best’ path
for the communication and delete the remaining ones. The choice can be made
by using different strategies, like picking the fastest path or the path containing
the PIs with the highest security coefficients.
Chapter 6
Communication Protection
Policies: Multi-graph
representation
Aiming for a model that also holds practical relevance, we investigated the
possibility of a user-friendly representation of the aforementioned anomalies
(Chapter 5). It is evident that logical formulas are not easily usable by admin-
istrators.
The obvious advantage of such a representation is that it allows a network
administrator to visualise the communications at a glance, intuitively identify
the anomalies, and immediately see the consequences and the proper reactions.
Starting by the hierarchical view of a network node, already sketched in
Section 5.3, we use the multi-graph theory to depict the secure communications
and have an equivalent representation of the FOL model described in the
previous chapter.
In this chapter, we represent all the CPP anomalies (but those out of place)
by using multi-graphs.
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6.1 Representation of Policy Implementation
In order to build an anomaly in this graphical representation, firstly we represent
the communication end-points by means of the tree-like notation shown in
Fig. 5.5, then we have to report the policy implementations.
The policy implementations that enforce end-to-end channels are represented
as single directed edges connecting two communication vertices, i.e. the proper
communication layer nodes. For instance, in Fig. 6.1, the edge connecting
Layer 3 nodes indicates the IPsec technology. To increase the expressiveness of
our representation, each edge is also labelled with both the technology and the
security coefficients required by the PI.
ca1
2
3
5
7
browser
sc1
2
3
5
db
5′
7′
web1
(3, 3, 3)
IPsec
(3, 3, 3)
IPsec
Fig. 6.1 Graphical representation of an end-to-end communication.
To represent the policy implementations that enforce site-to-site and remote-
access communications, instead, we add all the network node trees corresponding
to the crossed gateways and add a label (next to the technology) with the set
of network selectors. Fig. 6.2 reports an example of site-to-site communication.
In the end-to-end communication, for sake of simplicity we do not show the
selector tuple S, because S is equal to the all-matching tuple (∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, . . . ).
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cc1
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2
3
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2
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web1
(1, 1, 1)
IPsec:(cc1, ∗, sc1, ∗, . . . )
IPsec:(sc1, ∗, cc1, ∗, . . . )
(1, 1, 1)
Fig. 6.2 Graphical representation of a site-to-site communication.
The following sections show the graphical representation of the communica-
tion protection policy anomaly, using as an example the network scenario in
Fig. 5.1.
6.2 PI level anomalies
The classification shown in Fig. 5.6 distinguishes four types of PI level anomalies:
out of place, internal loop, non-enforceability and inadequacy.
Out of place
As we have anticipated in the previous paragraphs, out of place is the only
anomaly that will not be represented graphically. Visualizing this anomaly negli-
gibly boosts practical usefulness of our graphical representation and significantly
increases its complexity.
Internal loop
There is an internal loop anomaly when source and destination end-points are
on the same node, thus creating a data loop. In Fig. 6.3, source and destination
are the same layer 3 node of sc1.
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sc1
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db
5′
7′
web1
(3, 3, 3)
IPsec
Fig. 6.3 Graphical representation of an internal loop anomaly.
Non-enforceability
There is a non-enforceable PI when PI’s technology is not supported by the
source or by the destination, or when its security coefficients are ‘too high’, thus
preventing their enforcement. As Fig. 6.4 points out, a non-enforceable PI is
represented with an interrupted edge and an over-lined unsupported parameter
(technology and/or coefficients).
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web1
(3, 3, 10 )
IPsec
Fig. 6.4 Graphical representation of a non-enforceability anomaly.
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Inadequacy
There is an inadequacy anomaly when the security coefficients of a policy
implementation establish a channel with a security that is lower than an
acceptable threshold. As it is shown in Fig. 6.5, an inadequacy PI is represented
with an under-lined coefficient below the edge.
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Fig. 6.5 Graphical representation of an inadequacy anomaly.
6.3 Node level anomalies
Node level anomalies occur between two distinct policy implementations lying
on the same node. We can distinguish two families of anomalies: Intra-
technology anomalies and the Inter-technology anomalies. Shadowing, exception,
redundancy and correlation anomalies are Intra-technology anomalies, while the
inclusion, affinity and contradiction anomalies belong to the Inter-technology
anomalies.
Shadowing and Exception
As it is reported in Section 5.4.2, the PI i2 is shadowed when there is another
policy implementation i1 –with a higher priority– that matches all the traffic
of the first one and has disjoint security coefficients. Furthermore, i2 is an
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exception of another policy implementation i1 with a higher priority if they
have disjoint security coefficients and i2 is a superset match of i1. This means
that if i1 is shadowed by another PI i2, the policy implementation i2 is an
exception of i1.
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web1i1 i2
(3, 3, 0)
IPsec
(0, 0, 3)
IPsec
Fig. 6.6 Graphical representation of shadowing and exception anomalies.
Fig. 6.6 offers an example of shadowing and exception anomalies, where the
first policy implementation i1 (solid line) shadows the second policy implemen-
tation i2. In the graphical representation, priority is expressed by the distance
from the root node (lower distances meaning higher priority).
Affinity
Two PIs are affine since they share some common aspects, but none of them
includes the other one. Fig. 6.7 shows an affinity anomaly between two PIs.
The first policy implementation (solid line) enforces IPsec in transport mode
and only requires confidentiality, while the second one (dashed line) uses TLS
and enforces both payload and header integrity.
An administrator may understand that he can only use (1) either the IPsec
channel, if also he adds payload and header integrity, (2) the TLS channel, if
he adds confidentiality, or (3) that he can even keep both (provided he adds at
least payload integrity to the IPsec channel, that is independently highlighted
as an inadequacy anomaly).
6.3 Node level anomalies 77
ca1
2
3
5
7
browser
sc1
2
3
5
db
5′
7′
web1i1 i2
(0, 0, 3)
IPsec
(3, 3, 0)
TLS
Fig. 6.7 Graphical representation of an affinity anomaly.
Redundancy
A i2 PI is redundant when there is another policy implementation i1 with a
higher priority that matches all the traffic of the first one and its security
coefficients are equal or dominate the other PI’s coefficients. The following
Fig. 6.8 is the representation of redundancy anomalies.
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Fig. 6.8 Graphical representation of a redundancy anomaly.
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Correlation
The PI i2 is correlated (Fig. 6.9) with another policy implementation i1, if
source and destination of i1 and i2 belong to the same node and there is no
other Intra-technology anomaly between policy implementations (i.e. shadowing,
redundancy or exception). Fig. 6.9 represent the correlation between i1 e i2.
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Fig. 6.9 Graphical representation of a correlation anomaly.
Contradiction
Two PIs i1 and i2 are in a contradiction if their sources/destinations lie on the
same node, but one PI uses the NULL technology and the other one specifies
a security protocol. Fig. 6.10 represents a contradiction anomaly among two
PIs. The first PI (solid line) required NULL technology, while the second one
(dashed line) uses TLS and enforces both payload and header integrity.
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Fig. 6.10 Graphical representation of a contradiction anomaly.
Inclusion
The PI i1 includes (or dominates) i2 policy implementation when all the fields
of i1 dominate or are equal to their respective i2 fields, but one, which is
strictly dominant. Fig. 6.11 shows an example of graphical representation of
an inclusion anomaly.
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Fig. 6.11 Graphical representation of an inclusion anomaly.
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6.4 Network level anomalies
Network level anomalies occur between distinct PIs that belong to different
nodes. These anomalies are split in two main categories: path and channel
anomalies. Cyclic path, monitorability and alternative path are path anomalies,
while channel anomalies are superfluous, filtered channel, L2, skewed channel
and asymmetric channel anomalies.
Superfluous
Fig. 6.12 depicts a superfluous anomaly. We recall that a channel is superfluous
when another channel covers at least the same traffic, protecting as well the
communication with a higher security level. In this case, the IPsec tunnel
between gc3 and gc2 is redundant, so an administrator immediately sees that it
can be safely removed.
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Fig. 6.12 Graphical representation of a superfluous anomaly.
Monitorability
Fig.. 6.13 depicts a Monitorability path anomaly. The multi-graph clearly
shows that i1 and i2 form a logical connection between Cb1 and Sc1 by breaking
it into two channels interconnected through Gc1. This means that, even if the
data is encrypted, in Gc1 it is possible to spy the traffic of the communication
between Cb1 and Sc1.
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Fig. 6.13 Graphical representation of a monitorability anomaly.
Skewed channel
Two PIs i1 and i2 that define two tunnels produce a Skewed channel anomaly
if their respective channels overlap. Fig. 6.14 show an example of tunnels
overlapped.
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Fig. 6.14 Graphical representation of a Skewed channel anomaly.
Cyclic path
As Fig. 6.15 points out, there is a cyclic path anomaly between two network
nodes (cc1 and sc1) if there is at least one cycle in the path that connects them.
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Fig. 6.15 Graphical representation of a cyclic path anomaly.
Filtered channel
A policy implementation is filtered when at least one node exists in its path
with a filtering rule that discards all its traffic. Fig. 6.16 shows an example
of filtered channel anomaly, where the node Gc2 filtered the communication
between cb1 and sc1.
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Fig. 6.16 Graphical representation of a filtered channel anomaly.
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L2
We have a L2 anomaly when a PI that uses a layer two technology crosses an
area using a different layer 2 protocol. For instance in Fig. 6.17, we have a L2
anomaly because the WPA2 policy implementation between ca1 and ca3 crosses
the Ethernet nodes ga1, so that we can not use WPA2 for the whole path.
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Fig. 6.17 Graphical representation of a L2 anomaly.
Asymmetric channel
There is Asymmetric channel anomaly for a policy implementation if no other
PI with the source and destination swapped and the same technology, security
coefficients and list of crossed gateways (in reverse order). Fig. 6.18 shows the
graphical representation of an asymmetric channel anomaly. In this example
the fist PI (solid line) crossed Gb1 while the second PI (dotted line) crossed
Gb2.
Alternative path
There is an alternative path anomaly, when there are two or more paths that
can be taken from the source node to the destination node. Fig. 6.19 shows
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the two paths between cb1 and sc1, the first (solid line) crossed gc1 while the
second (dashed line) crossed gc2 and gc3.
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Fig. 6.18 Graphical representation of an asymmetric channel anomaly.
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Fig. 6.19 Graphical representation of an alternative path anomaly.
Chapter 7
Communication Protection
Policies: Model Validation
In this section, we will present an evaluation of the suitability of our anomaly
analysis model. Further details are available in Appendix B.
7.1 Empirical assessment
In order to evaluate the practical importance of our work, we conducted an
empirical assessment. We tried to answer two simple yet interesting research
questions:
1. Are the anomalies presented in this paper actually introduced by admin-
istrators when configuring the CPPs?
2. Does the number of anomalies decrease when administrator expertise
grows?
If the first research question RQ1 were confirmed, we could deduce that
performing the detection can help improving the policy enforcement correctness
in real world networks.
We mainly focused on the new kinds of anomalies presented in this thesis.
This is the reason why we did not report statistics on anomalies already present
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in literature, namely shadowing, redundancy, exception, correlation, skewed
channel (overlapping sessions) and out of place (irrelevances) whose importance
has been already proved in other original works [57, 58, 40]. We designed the
experiment to be completed by administrators in one hour, therefore we avoided
to provide data link information and kept the size of the network reasonably
low. This justifies the fact that L2, asymmetric channel, cycle and alternative
path anomalies were not considered in our study.
In order to answer the research questions, we conducted an experiment by
recruiting a set of 30 subjects. We split them into three categories according
to their expertise level (high, medium and low expertise), each one containing
10 people. In the test, we have considered as high-level expert administrators
those who have more than two years of experience in the security field, as
medium level experts administrators with more than two years of practice in
the (non-security) network field and as low level experts the remaining ones.
We asked them to enforce five CPPs (e.g. “all the administrators must
securely reach the accounting service”) by implementing them as a set of PIs.
The landscape was a small network (consisting of 5 subnets, 6 servers, 9 clients
and 10 gateways). The network description and the CPPs were available online
to the participants both as a web page and as a PDF document to be accessed
offline. The participants were asked to write all the PIs where any field was
constrained to be valid values (e.g. correct node and protocol names), in order
to avoid uninteresting errors. We did not impose neither a time limit nor a
maximum number of PIs.
The analysis of the data collected through such an experiment gave us
some extremely interesting information. First of all, 93% of the administrators
introduced at least one anomaly, regardless of the expertise (Table 7.1). In addi-
tion, all the new anomalies have been introduced by at least one administrator
(Table 7.2). Interestingly enough, all the anomaly types but contradictions were
also introduced by expert administrators. This result successfully answered
positively the RQ1 research question, that is the anomalies presented in this
paper can appear in real world scenario, hence it is useful to look for them.
The RQ2 research question (the more the expertise of administrators the
less the anomalies) has been also confirmed for all the macro-categories of
anomalies but one, suboptimal implementations (Table 7.4). Obviously, having
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Experience Insecure communications Unfeasible communications Potentialerrors Suboptimal implementations At least one type
Low 70.00% 60.00% 60.00% 70.00% 100.00%
Medium 60.00% 30.00% 50.00% 40.00% 90.00%
High 30.00% 20.00% 20.00% 70.00% 90.00%
Average 53.33% 36.67% 43.33% 60% 93.33%
Table 7.1 Percentage of administrators that created at least one anomaly in a
macro-category.
Experience Internal loop Non-enforceability Inadequacy Inclusion Affinity Monitorability Superfluous Filtered Contradiction
Low 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 30.00% 50.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00% 30.00%
Medium 10.00% 20.00% 40.00% 20.00% 40.00% 20.00% 30.00% 10.00% 10.00%
High 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 50.00% 10.00% 0.00%
Average 13.33% 20.00% 30.00% 23.33% 36.67% 33.33% 30.00% 16.33% 13.33%
Table 7.2 Percentage of administrators that created at least one anomaly.
Experience Internal loop Non-enforceability Inadequacy Inclusion Affinity Monitorability Superfluous Filtered Contradiction
Low 1.49% 4.48% 10.95% 2.99% 6.97% 2.99% 7.46% 17.91% 8.96%
Medium 1.50% 3.76% 13.53% 4.51% 5.26% 3.01% 3.76% 9.02% 4.51%
High 1.61% 0.81% 4.03% 3.23% 2.24% 8.87% 8.06% 3.23% 0.00%
Average 1.53% 3.28% 9.83% 3.49% 5.24% 6.55% 4.59% 11.35% 5.24%
Table 7.3 Percentages of anomalies introduced by administrators.
Experience Insecure communications Unfeasible communications Potential errors Suboptimal implementations Total
Low 18.41% 22.39% 15.92% 7.46% 64.18%
Medium 16.54% 12.78% 9.77% 9.77% 48.87%
High 12.90% 4.03% 2.42% 12.90% 32.26%
Average 16.38% 14.63% 10.48% 9.61% 51.09%
Table 7.4 Percentages of anomalies introduced by administrators grouped in macro-
categories.
a better understanding of a network and its different security controls, reduces
the chance of introducing anomalies. This is particularly evident for the filtered
anomalies, as administrators also have to consider interactions with firewalls to
avoid them, but it is also valid for the non-enforceability, inadequacy, affinity,
and contradiction anomalies (Table 7.3).
On the other hand, suboptimal implementations tend to increase, because
expert administrators add more superfluous anomalies than the inexpert ones.
This is due to the fact that highly experienced administrators tend to add several
levels of protection to the communication (defense in depth), although this was
not expressly required in the exercise. Moreover, expert administrators’ PIs also
contain several monitorability anomalies, since they tend to make an extensive
use of tunnels while the less experienced ones mainly use end-to-end channels.
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In short, experienced administrators tend to break secure communications to
improve overall network performances. In this sample network, monitorability
anomalies are not the most serious issues (as we had homogeneous security
levels in all the networks). Nonetheless, it is certainly better to double check
them. Finally, there are a number of internal loop anomalies, probably due to
mere distraction errors, that are constant regardless of the expertise level.
To assess the statistical significance of the results split into three expertise
levels (high, medium and low), we performed an analysis of variances (ANOVA)
with a significance level of 0.05 (the most commonly used threshold).
We assume that a hypothesis is valid if the significance level is less than
0.05 (the most commonly used threshold).
ANOVA tests the non-specific null hypothesis (H0) that all three population
means are equal, that is:
H0 : µhigt = µmedium = µlow
On the other hand, the alternative hypotheses is obviously:
Ha : H0 is false
We performed the ANOVA analysis on two different data sets:
• the number of anomalies introduced by each administrator (test 1);
• the number of anomaly types introduced by each administrator (test 2).
The computed P-values of the ANOVA are 0.034 (test1) and 0.006 (test2).
In both cases, being the P-values less than the significance level, the null
hypothesis can be rejected, thus the population means are not all equal when
introducing anomalies. In addition both the F statistic numbers are greater
than their minimum F critical values, further contributing to accepting the
alternative hypothesis [102].
In the following sections we report more details about our analysis.
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7.1.1 Test 1 – anomalies for each administrator
In Table 7.5 we present the number of anomalies introduced by each admin-
istrator depending on their expertise. Administrators have been divided in
l1-l10, m1-m10 and h1-h10. Each cell value represents the number of anomalies
introduced by an administrator.
Table 7.6 shows the statistical results computed on these data, while Ta-
ble 7.7 details the ANOVA computation values [102]. The table columns have
the following meanings:
• SS stands for ‘Sum of Squares’ and it is the sum of squared deviations;
• df is the acronym for ‘Degree of Freedom’;
• MS is the ‘the Mean sum of Squares due to the source’;
• F is the ‘F statistic’, a value used to accept the alternative hypothesis if
it is large enough;
• P-value is the ‘Probability’ of having an F statistic large enough such
that the null hypothesis is true;
• F crit is the ‘F critical value’, used to accept the alternative hypothesis if
F statistic is greater than this threshold.
7.1.2 Test2 – anomaly types for each administrator
Table 7.8 presents the number of anomaly types that has been triggered: an
anomaly type has been considered if at least one anomaly of that type has
been introduced by the administrators. We indicated how many anomaly types
have been introduced for each expertise level. Tables 7.9 and 7.10 show the
statistical results computed on these data.
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high expertise administrators
admin h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10
anomaly # 1 2 2 4 10 7 0 2 5 7
medium expertise administrators
admin m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10
anomaly # 6 7 6 2 3 0 7 6 6 22
low expertise administrators
admin l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 l6 l7 l8 l9 l10
anomaly # 4 20 24 4 20 19 13 4 9 12
Table 7.5 Anomalies count per administrators (test 1).
expertise admins anomalies sum average anomalies variance
high 10 40 4 10.222
medium 10 65 6.5 35.167
low 10 129 12.9 57.211
Table 7.6 Statistics for test 1.
source of variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
between groups 421.4 2 210.7 6.161 0.006 3.354
within groups 923.4 27 34.2
Table 7.7 ANOVA for test 1.
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high expertise administrators
admin h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10
anomaly # 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 2 3 2
medium expertise administrators
admin m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10
anomaly # 1 3 1 2 2 0 3 2 3 4
low expertise administrators
admin l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 l6 l7 l8 l9 l10
anomaly # 3 4 4 3 1 3 3 1 3 4
Table 7.8 Anomaly types count per administrators (test 2).
expertise admins anomaly types sum average type variance
high 10 16 1.6 0.711
medium 10 21 2.1 1.433
low 10 29 2.9 1.211
Table 7.9 Statistics for test 2.
source of variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
between groups 8.6 2 4.3 3.84 0.034 3.354
within groups 30.2 27 1.119
Table 7.10 ANOVA for test 2.
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7.2 Complexity analysis
We will now derive some complexity formulas that prove the theoretical perfor-
mance of our model. We will start with a simple observation. Our approach
can be split in two consecutive phases. The first one is a pre-computation phase,
where the tree representation of the network and its paths are obtained. The
second one is an analysis phase that consists of the real anomaly detection
pass.
Let’s suppose that we have a network consisting of E entities (IPs, ports,
addresses, . . . ), I policy implementations and C connections between the
network entities created by the PIs (obviously C ≥ I).
To create the tree representation of the network nodes, we need to check
every single entity, so that this process has an exact complexity of E . Finding
all the simple paths1 in an acyclic graph is a NExpTime problem with a
maximum complexity of O(eE). Note, however, that real networks are scarcely
connected and that multiple paths between two different nodes are quite rare,
making these calculations also feasible in large IT infrastructures. In addition,
an administrator can choose to limit the number of paths to check some fixed
value P , typically P≪ eE . Hence, the total complexity of the pre-computation
phase is E + P .
Regarding the analysis phase, we have to take into account the distinct
characteristics of anomaly detection formulas. In particular, we have that:
• internal loop, out of place, non-enforceability, inadequacy, filtered channel,
L2 and asymmetric channel anomalies algorithms work on a single PI at
a time, so that they have a complexity of I;
• shadowing, redundancy, exception and inclusion anomalies algorithms
needs an ordered pair of PIs, thus having a complexity of I(I − 1).
Superfluous anomalies as well have a quadratic complexity since they
needs to test every PI against all the other ones;
• correlation, affinity and skewed channel anomalies algorithms work on
unordered pairs of PIs, giving a complexity of I(I − 1)/2;
1A simple path is a path with no duplicate vertices.
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• monitorability and alternative path anomalies algorithms work on every
path, hence they have a complexity of P ;
• cyclic path anomaly algorithm can be efficiently performed using a proper
cycle detection algorithm such as [101], that has a complexity of O(E+C).
Note that its complexity is not necessarily P since a graph with some
loops has an infinite number of paths.
Summarising, the total complexity of the analysis phase is:
I + I(I − 1) + P +O(E + C) ≈ I2 + P +O(E + C)
7.3 Performance analysis
We implemented our anomaly detection model and tested it in several scenarios
using a number of synthetically generated networks in order to assess its running
time.
Our tool was developed using Java 1.8 and exploited the natural graph-based
representation of ontologies offered by OWL API 3.4.10 and the reasoner Pellet
2.3.1. We performed all our tests on an Intel i7 @ 2.4 GHz with 16 GB RAM
under Windows 7.
Each test was performed on several ad-hoc scenarios consisting of an au-
tomatically generated network with a parametric structure where we could
specify: 1) the number of network entities; 2) the number of policy implemen-
tations; 3) the percentage of conflicting PIs. We chose to fix the number of
conflicting PIs at about 50%, since, from our empirical analysis, on average,
an administrator only writes about half of the policy implementations without
any kind of conflict (Table 7.4). We performed two main kinds of tests. In the
first one, we fixed the number of network entities and increased the number
of PIs, while in the second one, we did the opposite (fixing the number of PIs
and changing the entities count). Fig. 7.1 shows the test results when fixing
the number of PIs respectively at 100, 250 and 500, while Fig. 7.2 shows the
graphs when the network entities count is 100, 250 and 500. For each test, we
kept track of three times: pre-computation phase (dotted lines), analysis phase
(dashed lines) and total times (the solid lines).
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Our tool proved to be very scalable, achieving a total time of less than two
minutes in the worst scenario (500 PIs and 500 network entities). In addition,
the results are aligned with the complexity analysis discussed in Section 7.2.
For instance, by increasing the number of network entities (Fig. 7.1), we may
observe that the times tend to grow, while by fixing the number of entities
(Fig. 7.2) the pre-computation phase time is completely unaffected.
All the tests presented in this Chapter were conducted on a set of syntheti-
cally generated networks. Note that the generated scenarios do not provide a
fully specified network. The output network graph just includes the minimum
information used by our anomaly classification algorithms to work (e.g. no
middleboxes, not all the connections between network nodes). Our generation
algorithm is parametric and takes as input three arguments: 1) the number of
non-conflicting PIs nPI ; 2) the number of conflicting PIs nPI ; 3) the number of
network entities ne.
Our approach works in three sequential steps:
1. generation of nPI non-conflicting PIs. This phase randomly generates
policy implementations until the desired number of PIs is produced.
Depending on the type of secure communication types, three different
procedures are implemented:
• end-to-end scheme: a new client and a new server are randomly gen-
erated and added to the network graph. The connection endpoints
are then used to form a single PI that connects them with randomly
chosen non-NULL end-to-end technology;
• site-to-site scheme: a new client, a new server and ng ≥ 2 gateways
are randomly created and added to the network graph. A set of
edges are added to the network graph to properly connect the client
and the server with the close gateways and to connect the gateways
in the proper order. Then, the algorithm creates a PI connecting the
client to the server (which may use the NULL technology) and ng−1
PIs to form ng − 1 tunnels that connect pairs of adjacent gateways.
The selector of the intended client-server traffic was associated to
the PI;
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• remote-access scheme: a new client, a new server, and nh ≥ 1
gateways are randomly created and added to the network graph
nodes. Then, the algorithm creates a PI connecting the client to the
server (which may use the NULL technology) and ng PIs to form
ng tunnels from the client to the last gateway. The selector of the
intended client-server traffic was associated to the PI.
2. generation of nPI conflicting PIs. This phase randomly generates the
policy implementations to introduce the anomalies. The algorithm first
picks with the same probability one of the nineteen anomalies in our
model. Then it selects zero or more network entities generated during the
previous step (the exact number depends on the chosen anomaly) and, if
needed, it randomly generates the required entities. Finally, it creates
the PIs accordingly;
3. network graph completion. During this phase, the algorithm first ran-
domly generates the network entities until the limit ne is reached. Note
that this phase might be skipped if all the previous phases have already
generated all the required network entities. Subsequently, the algorithm
completes the network adding a bare minimum set of network connections,
if necessary. Note that, in the general case, a full network connectivity
is not required, and hence not computed, since we are only interested
in computing the analysis time of our implementation and adding such
additional data does not impact our tool’s performance tests.
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Fig. 7.1 Time to perform the anomaly
analysis of a fixed number of PIs depend-
ing on the number of entities.
100 200 300 400 500
0
20
40
60
80
PI count
T
im
e
[s
]
(a) With 100 entities.
100 200 300 400 500
0
20
40
60
80
PI count
T
im
e
[s
]
(b) With 250 entities.
100 200 300 400 500
0
50
100
PI count
T
im
e
[s
]
(c) With 500 entities.
Fig. 7.2 Time to perform the anomaly
analysis on networks of a fixed size de-
pending on the number of PIs.
Unified Model for Policy
Analysis

Chapter 8
Unified Policy Analysis: Model
Definition
We recall that, the complexity of the network topology together with the
heterogeneity of network services make the network security policy specification
a hard task, even for skilled and experienced administrators.
In this chapter, we presents the UMPA model (Unified Model for Policy
Analysis) for detecting network conflicts and irregularities, in order to avoid
erroneous and unexpected network behaviours. As we have already mentioned,
the literature has proposed approaches of anomaly analysis applied into a
single policy domain (Intra-domain analysis), while the UMPA model aims
at embracing many policy domains in a single analysis process by performing
what we name Inter-domain policy analysis.
8.1 Motivating Example
In this section, before formally describing the concepts of the UMPA model,
we present an example to informally introduce our work.
We use as a reference the simplified network scenario depicted in Fig. 8.1,
where different users connect via remote access to the corporate data center.
Some services are used by all the corporate users and they are located in
the “Global” subnet, which includes the mail server and an anti-spamming
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functionality. Other services are department-specific and they are located in
the Department1-3 subnets. Department1 offers an internal repository and a
database, Department2 provides an application service, while Department3 has
three file servers (e.g. FTP servers) managed by a service of intrusion detection.
Fig. 8.1 Reference example of a network scenario.
In this example, a user is authorized to access the corporate mail server
and the services available for the department he belongs to. To implement this
policy, user traffic has to pass through a set of security controls before accessing
the different services. Indeed, at the border, there are a VPN gateway, a traffic
monitor, a firewall and a router. These security functions process the ingress
traffic exactly in this order, dropping or altering the traffic by forwarding (i.e.
the firewall) and modifying the headers and/or payloads of the packets received
(i.e. the VPN gateway). They can also log traffic info (i.e. the monitor).
Moreover, there are other high-level requirements to implement:
i) drop all the encrypted traffic in outbound to prevent any information
disclosure;
ii) permit access to authenticated users;
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iii) use a load balancer to access the Department2 applications;
iv) supervise the access to the file servers of Department3 (through an IDS).
Although the proposed scenario is small and simple, we can find some
Inter-domain anomalies (defined in Chapter 4). Let us assume the following
authorized activities:
• User1 wants to connect via SSH to the Department1 DB;
• User2 wants to access the Department2 application service;
• User3 wants to download a file from the Department3 file server.
In this case, an administrator may notice four incorrect implementations of the
security requirements:
1. the monitor cannot analyse the traffic towards the DB because it is
encrypted;
2. User1 does not receive responses from DB because the firewall drops the
traffic;
3. the monitor cannot distinguish the three different application servers
because the load balancer rewrites the source IP addresses;
4. the IDS configuration depends directly on the firewall configuration.
These inconsistencies can be detected by means of the UMPA model, which
is able to identify the anomalies by analysing the policies of the security
functions in the network. In particular, we focus on the modification induced
by the function into the packets.
For each security function, it is necessary to specify its capabilities (in terms
of the actions it can apply to the packets) and the configuration rules, i.e. its
policy. The model outputs the anomalies as a set of rule pairs that need to be
inspected by an administrator. The anomalous rules may belong to different
security functions (i.e. Inter-domain anomalies).
In the next sections, we will show how our model enables the discovery
of these anomalies. Informally, for anomalies (1) and (3), the monitor, a
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function that only reads information in the packet, has a rule to log packets
that are received after another function has modified them. In the case (1), the
modification is performed by the VPN gateway, in the case (3), by the load
balancer. For anomaly (2), it is the rule to drop all the encrypted traffic that
prevents replies from reaching User2. Our model detects that there is a filtering
rule dropping packets that are transformed (i.e. encrypted). Analogously, for
anomaly (4), the model discovers that the IDS has to look into traffic that is
filtered by another function.
8.2 Modelling Approach
In this section, we describe the UMPA model, which is able to both represent
network policies of different domains and to detect the Intra- and Inter-domain
anomalies among such policies. In order to perform those targets, the model of
a network security policy is composed of four sets, that are:
Network fields
The network fields are atomic elements that identify information a network
policy needs to keep track. In others word, the network fields are representations
of the necessary state and/or prerequisites that define whether a policy rule
actions should be performed. When the network fields associated with a policy
rule evaluate to TRUE, then (subject to other considerations such as rule
priorities and decision strategies) the rule should be enforced.
Examples of such network fields (but they are not limited to) could be the
packet headers. Other information (e.g. network node ID, traffic label, cipher
algorithm etc...) could be needed to designate the events and conditions an
administrator wants to manage.
Policy actions
The policy actions are a set of atomic elements that represent either the real
action performed by a network node (e.g. a firewall is configured to deny or
allow a packet under certain conditions), or the parameters and information
that characterize that action (e.g. algorithm, technologies, protocols to use);
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Policy Implementation
We recall that the Policy Implementation (PI ) is a data-structure to pinpoint
in a formal and abstract way the policy rules enforced by a network node for
a certain domain. This means that the PI data-structure must be defined so
that the PI :
i) identifies the condition and events that administrators want to manage
through conditions expressed on the network fields;
ii) knows the policy actions that describe the way those events are managed;
iii) is designed to be applied to a specific policy domain.
In the UMPA model, we have extended the (PIs) that we have presented in
Chapter 5. In particular, we raise the level of generalization of the PI structure
in order to be able to map many policy domains in a single model.
Detection rules
The detection rules are a set of conditions that distinguish the possible anomalies
among PIs. For a particular policy domain, it is possible to exploit the existing
works on the policy analysis for that domain. Otherwise, an administrator
could define his set of PI anomalies, either Intra-domain and Inter-domain.
Now we start to analyse in depth the PI structure and then the PI anomalies.
8.2.1 PI structure
A PI is composed of a sequential set of network fields (n) and a set of policy
actions (a):
pii = (ni1, ni2, ..., nim, ai1, ai2, ..., aim)
Actually, a PI has a different set of network fields and policy actions, based
on the domain where the PI is defined. In addition, among the network fields
and policy actions of the PIs, a set of relations R must be defined in order
to establish the PI anomalies. In detail, the proposed model supports four
relations R between network fields (the same relations can be defined for the
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policy actions), which are satisfied based on the real values taken by the network
fields (or actions) involved in the relations:
• equivalence: the k-th network fields of two policy implementations (pii
and pij) are equivalent (or equal) if they have exactly the same value;
nik = njk
• dominance: the k-th network field of pii dominates the k-th network
field of pij if it is a generalization of the latter. For example, ni1 is the
IP addresses 1.1.*.* and nj1 is the IP address 1.1.1.*, in this case ni1
dominates nj1;
nik ≻ njk
• correlation: two network fields (nik and njk) of two policy implementa-
tions (pii and pij) are correlated if they share some common values, but
none of them includes (or dominates) the other one. For example, if ni1
and nj1 are port number and ni1 ranges from 1 to 75, while nj1 from 50
to 100, then they are correlated because the range [50, 75] is shared by
both fields;
nik ∼ njk
• disjointness: two network fields (nik and njk) are disjoint if they do
not share any value. On the other hand, if a network field is equivalent,
correlated or dominates another, those fields are not-disjoint (nik ̸⊥ njk).
nik ⊥ njk
Note that a network filed (or a policy action) may not support one of the
aforementioned relations, due to the value type it takes (e.g. integer, IP address,
boolean, enumeration and more). For example, a port number can be equal to
another one, but it cannot dominate a range of port numbers. Instead a range
of port numbers can dominate a single value of port number.
The proposed set of relations allows the model to achieve high-level flexibility
and generality in order to:
1. extend to more domains;
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2. detect anomalies among policy rules of different domains;
3. enrich the set of policy anomalies (Inter- and Intra-domain) by allowing
administrators to define their own set of anomalies.
In fact this set of relations R gives the means to impose conditions on PI
elements, whose value types are not known a-priori.
8.2.2 PI anomaly detection rules
The PI anomalies (A) are defined in form of detection rules. The detection
rules are, in turn, defined according to the existing relations R among the
network fields and policy actions of a PI.
In the proposed model, the detection rules are based on the FOL and
are expressed using Horn clauses. Horn clauses are frequently encountered in
model theory because they exhibit a simple and natural rule-like form. Also,
these clauses can be easily translated in many different logic programming
languages, such as Prolog, or generic programming language such as C or Java.
In particular, the Horn clauses can be simply used to represent all the axioms
used in the proposed model, expressed in the form of disjunction of literals
(clauses) with at most one positive literal:
¬C1 ∨ ¬C2 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Cn ∨ I
Alternatively, they can be expressed in a more natural way as a set of positive
conditions implying an assertion and this is the form chosen in our model:
C1 ∧ C2 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn ⇒ I
In our model, every clause is the relation between network fields (e.g. nk)
or policy actions (e.g. ak) of one or more PIs (e.g. pii and pij), also belonging
to different domain, like this example:
C1 := nik R nih, C2 := nik R njh
C3 := aik R aih, C4 := aik R ajh
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where nik and njh (or aik and ajh) identify two generic network fields (or
policy actions) in the ordered sequence of network fields (or actions) in the PI
structure.
Hence a generic form of a detection rule can take a form like the following,
but they are not limited:
niq R njq ∧ ... ∧ nik R njh ∧ ... ∧ aik R ajh ⇒ A(pii, pij)
where A(pii, pij) is the anomaly triggered by the policy implementations pii
and pij.
Furthermore, the Horn clauses support the also the Universal (∀) and
Existential (∃) quantifier:
∀x|(¬C1 ∨ ¬C2 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Cn ∨ A)
∃x|(¬C1 ∨ ¬C2 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Cn ∨ A)
where x consists of variables appearing in I and in the Bj .
Hence examples of detection rules can take a form like the following:
∀niq, njq| ∧ niq R njq ∧ ... ∧ nik R njh ∧ ... ∧ aik R ajh ⇒ A(pii, pij)
∃niq, njq| ∧ niq R njq ∧ ... ∧ nik R njh ∧ ... ∧ aik R ajh ⇒ A(pii, pij)
In addition in our model we extend the definition of Clause with these
axioms:
• a set of condition is also a condition C1 = C2 ∧ C3 ∧ ... ∧ Cn
• the negation of a condition is also a condition C1 = ¬C2
Having provided an overview of how we model the network security policies
and the anomalies in the UMPA model, we now move to apply our model to
the use-case of anomaly analysis.
Chapter 9
Unified Policy Analysis: Model
Validation
In this chapter, we analyse three policy types: communication protection,
filtering and traffic flow policies. For each of them, using the aforementioned
UMPA model, we present an example of possible PI structure and a definition
of detection rules that represent the Intra-domain and Inter-domain policy
anomalies.
For the filtering policies, we use the main important work in this domain
proposed by Al-shaer et al. [8].
While for the second case study of the communication protection policies,
we refer to our study on the analysis presented in this thesis (Chapter 5). As
concerning the latter, a new definition of PI structure and detection rules is
proposed, in the domain of flow-based policy.
We have considered these three case-studies to prove the generality and
flexibility of our model, because it is able to cope with a variety of scenarios,
like case-studies already known in the literature or new examples of policies
both security-related and not.
Finally in the last section of this chapter, we report a fist approach Inter-
domain policy analysis among the three policy types used as use case.
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9.1 Packet Filter Policy
In order to validate the usability and expressibility of this model, we use as
example the well-known Packet Filtering Policies (PFPs) domain.
PFPs are used in a single- or multi-firewall environment to defend secured
networks by filtering unwanted or unauthorized traffic from or to the secured
network. For an administrator, it could become difficult to correctly deploy
a large number of PFPs in a network with many firewalls and easy to trigger
packet filter.
Therefore a PFP anomaly analysis is needed and it can be based on a PIs
structure composed of eight network fields:
pifp = (f, r, ip_src, ip_dst, t, p_src, p_dst, a)
where:
• f is an incremental firewall identifier to reflect the order in which the
received traffic is processed by a sequence of firewalls;
• r is an incremental firewall rule identifier, valid within the firewall identi-
fied by f ;
• ip_src and ip_dst are respectively the source and destination IP ad-
dresses of the traffic , can take as possible values a single IP (e.g. 192.1.1.1),
a range of IP values (e.g. 192.1.1.1 – 192.1.2.1) or * (all values);
• t is the protocol type that can be TCP, UDP or * (all values);
• p_src and p_dst are respectively the ranges of the source and destination
port numbers ;
• a is the policy action that the firewall must carry out if the received traffic
matches with the current policy and that can assume either accept or
deny as value.
The set of relations R that can exist between network fields of pii and pij
depends on their value types (e.g. f is an integer, while ip_src is an IP address)
and can be summarized as follows:
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Fig. 9.1 Al-Shaer’s classification of Packet Filter policy anomalies.
• fi and ri can be equal to or can dominate the relative field of pij (e.g.
fi ≻ fj, if fi is equal to 6, while fj is equal to 3);
• ip_src, ip_dst, p_src and p_dst can be equal, disjointed or can dominate
the relative fields of pij;
• finally, ai and ti can be equal or disjointed to tj and aj.
Concerning the definition of detection rules, we can leverage the anomaly
classification proposed in [8]. As show in Chapter 3, the authors have paid
attention to two main types of conflicts between FPs, that are the Intra- and
Inter-firewall anomalies (Fig. 9.1):
• Intra-Firewall Shadowing anomaly
fi = fj ∧ rj ≻ ri ∧ ip_srci ≽ ip_srcj ∧ ti ≽ tj ∧ ip_dsti ≽ ip_dstj∧
p_srci ≽ p_srcj ∧ p_dsti ≽ p_dstj ∧ ai ̸= aj ⇒ Intra-Shadowing(pii,pij)
• Intra-Firewall Correlation anomaly
fi = fj ∧ ip_srci ̸⊥ ip_srcj ∧ ti ̸⊥ tj ∧ ip_dsti ̸⊥ ip_dstj∧
p_srci ̸⊥ p_srcj ∧ p_dsti ̸⊥ p_dstj ∧ ai ̸= aj ⇒ Intra-Correlation(pii,pij)
• Intra-Firewall Generalization anomaly
fi = fj ∧ ri ≻ rj ∧ ip_srci ≻ ip_srcj ∧ ti ≻ tj ∧ ip_dsti ≻ ip_dstj∧
p_srci ≻ p_srcj ∧ p_dsti ≻ p_dstj ∧ ai ̸= aj ⇒ Intra-Generalization(pii,pij)
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• Intra-Firewall Redundancy anomaly
fi = fj ∧ rj ≻ ri ∧ ip_srci ≽ ip_srcj ∧ ti ≽ tj ∧ ip_dsti ≽ ip_dstj∧
p_srci ≽ p_srcj ∧ p_dsti ≽ p_dstj ∧ ai = aj ⇒ Intra-Redundancy(pii,pij)
• Inter-Firewall Shadowing anomaly
fi ≻ fj ∧ ip_srci ≽ ip_srcj ∧ ti ≽ tj ∧ ip_dsti ≽ ip_dstj ∧ p_srci ≽ p_srcj∧
p_dsti ≽ p_dstj ∧ ai = accept ∧ aj = deny⇒ Inter-Shadowing(pii,pij)
fi ≻ fj ∧ ip_srcj ≻ ip_srci ∧ tj ≻ ti ∧ ip_dstj ≻ ip_dsti ∧ p_srcj ≻ p_srci∧
p_dstj ≻ p_dsti ∧ ai = accept ∧ aj = deny⇒ Inter-Shadowing(pii,pij)
• Inter-Firewall Spuriousness anomaly
fi ≻ fj ∧ ip_srcj ≽ ip_srci ∧ tj ≽ ti ∧ ip_dstj ≽ ip_dsti ∧ p_srcj ≽ p_srci∧
p_dstj ≽ p_dsti ∧ aj = accept ∧ ai = deny⇒ Inter-Spuriousness(pii,pij)
fi ≻ fj ∧ ip_srci ≻ ip_srcj ∧ ti ≻ tj ∧ ip_dsti ≻ ip_dstj ∧ p_srci ≻ p_srcj∧
p_dsti ≻ p_dstj ∧ aj = accept ∧ ai = deny⇒ Inter-Spuriousness(pii,pij)
• Inter-Firewall Redundancy anomaly
fi ≻ fj ∧ ip_srci ≽ ip_srcj ∧ ip_dsti ≽ ip_dstj ∧ p_srci ≽ p_srcj∧
p_dsti ≽ p_dstj ∧ ti ≽ tj ∧ ai = aj = deny⇒ Inter-Redundancy(pii,pij)
• Inter-Firewall Correlation anomaly
fi ≻ fj ∧ ip_srci ̸⊥ ip_srcj ∧ ti ̸⊥ tj ∧ ip_dsti ̸⊥ ip_dstj∧
p_srci ̸⊥ p_srcj ∧ p_dsti ̸⊥ p_dstj ⇒ Inter-Correlation(pii,pij)
9.2 Communication Protection Policy 111
9.2 Communication Protection Policy
The second use case we consider to apply the UMPA model is the communication
protection policy. In this scenario, we review the concepts and the model
presented in Chapter 5 in order to map the Inter-technology analysis of this
type of policies in the UMPA model.
Thus the pi needed to model a communication protection policy in this
unified model takes the following structure:
i = (r, s, d, t, C, S,G)
where:
• r is an incremental rule identifier specific for the priority (the lower the
number the higher the priority);
• s and d symbolize the source and destination nodes and their possible
values could be either the network node id (Node) or a its IP address
(IP), port number (Port) or URI (URI);
• t specifies the adopted technology, that could be IPsec, TLS, SSH, WS-Security
or NULL;
• C characterizes the policy actions and are three security coefficients
values that denote a required security level for a specific property (header
integrity chi, payload integrity cpi and confidentiality cc);
• S is a tuple of network fields (i.e. Selector), used to identify the traffic
that need to be protected;
• G is an order list of the gateways involved in the communication;
The values s, d, S, G are network fields, while the values t, C are actions. We
also consider as extra network fields the function described in Chapter 5:
• N (i1) that returns the node where the PI is actually deployed;
• T (e) that returns the set of technologies supported by the node e;
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• Cmax(i1) that returns the set of maximum enforceable coefficients by PI
i1;
• Cmin(i1) that returns the minimum acceptable coefficients for the channel
defined by PI i1;
The CPP detection rules in the UMPA model are:
• Internal loop
s1 ̸⊥ d1 ⇒ Ail(i1)
• Out of place
N (i1) ⊥ s1 ⇒ Aop(i1)
• Non-enforceability
C1 ≻ Cmax(i1) ∨ T (s1) ̸≻ t1 ∨ t1 ̸∈ T (d1)⇒ Ane(i1)
• Inadequacy
C1 ≺ Cmin(i1)⇒ Ain(i1)
• Shadowing
r1 ≺ r2 ∧ t1 = t2 ∧ s1 ≽ s2 ∧ d1 ≽ d2
∧S1 ≽ S2 ∧ C1 ⊥ C2 ∧G1 = G2 ⇒ Ash(i1, i2)
• Redundancy
t1 = t2 ∧ s1 ≽ s2 ∧ d1 ≽ d2∧
∧S1 ≽ S2 ∧ C1 ≽ C2 ∧G1 = G2 ⇒ Are(i1, i2)
• Exception
r1 ≺ r2 ∧ t1 = t2 ∧ s1 ≺ s2 ∧ d1 ≺ d2∧
∧d1 ≺ d2 ∧ S1 ≻ S2 ∧ C1 ⊥ C2 ∧G1 = G2 ⇒ Aex(i1, i2)
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• Correlation
s1 ̸⊥ s2 ∧ d1 ̸⊥ d2 ∧ t1 = t2 ∧G1 = G2 ∧ S1 = S2∧
∧¬Csh(i1, i2) ∧ ¬Cex(i1, i2) ∧ ¬Cre(i1, i2)⇒ Aco(i1, i2)
where Csh(i1, i2), Cex(i1, i2) , Cre(i1, i2), are respectively the set of condition
of Shadowing, Exception and Redundancy anomaly
• Inclusion
s1 ≽ s2 ∧ d1 ≽ d2 ∧ t1 ≽ t2 ∧ C1 ≽ C2
∧S1 ≽ S2 ∧G1 = G2 ∧ i1 ̸= i2 ⇒ Ain(i1, i2)
• Affinity
(s1 ̸⊥ s2 ∧ d1 ̸⊥ d2 ∧ t1 ̸⊥ t2)∧
∧¬Cin(i1, i2) ∧ ¬Cin(i2, i1)⇒ Aaf (i1, i2)
• Contradiction
s1 ̸⊥ s2 ∧ d1 ̸⊥ d2 ∧ t1 ⊥ t2 ⇒ Aco(i1, i2)
9.3 Traffic Flow Policy
Service Function Chaining (SFC) [103] defines an ordered set of network
functions (e.g. NAT, load balancer, web cache) that processes the incoming
traffic. Here, forwarding policies can be used to configure the traffic flows that
must be processed by a given chain.
In literature, most of the existing works focused on the OpenFlow protocol,
which has been a successful SFC implementation. The detection of errors among
OpenFlow rules deployed into the OpenFlow switches has been addressed in
depth, while the correct forwarding policy definition at the SDN controller
layer was overlooked.
In order to validate that the proposed model is able to support administrator-
defined policy anomalies, we propose a new definition of PI structure and
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detection rules to detect forwarding policy anomalies at controller layer, in the
flow-based domain. The proposed PI is structured as follows:
pi = (ip_src, ip_dst, t, p_src, p_dst, C)
• ip_src and ip_dst symbolize the source and destination IP address of
the PI;
• t is the protocol type and can assume TCP or UDP as value;
• p_src and p_dst specify the ranges of the source and destination port
numbers;
• C is a parameter of the policy action that specifies the ordered set of
network functions towards traffic will be forwarded.
In addition, the possible relation R between PIs (pii and pij) could be similar
to the filtering policy case:
• ip_srci, ip_dsti, p_srci and p_dsti can be equal, disjoint or can domi-
nate the corresponding fields of pij;
• ti can be equal or disjoint to tj;
• Ci can be equal, disjointed, correlated or dominate to Cj.
For the sake of simplicity, the various network fields of a PI, apart from C, are
grouped under a single symbol, N . Hence the set of network fields Ni of pii
will have a relation R with the Nj of the pij, if certain conditions are verified.
We recall that those relations can be equivalence, dominance, disjointness or
correlation.
Finally, we also propose an example of possible PI anomalies between
SFCPs, which are represented by the following detection rules:
• Intra-PI Incorrect anomaly arises when the source and destination of a
traffic flow correspond. This means that the ip_src and ip_dst fields of
pii are equal and, hence, a forwarding loop is generated in the network
ip_srci = ip_dsti ⇒ Incorrect(pii)
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SFCP anomalies
Equivalent Correlation Ill-fitting Overlapping Incorrect
Fig. 9.2 An example of anomalies classification of Flow-based policies.
• Inter-PI Equivalent anomaly occurs if all network fields of pii and pij are
equal
Ni = Nj ∧ Ci = Cj ⇒ Equivalent(pii,pij)
• Inter-PI Ill-fitting Anomaly occurs if Ni dominates Nj and Cj dominates
Ci. Ni must be redefined to be disjointed to Nj
Ni ≻ Nj ∧ Cj ≻ Ci ⇒ Ill-fitting(pii,pij)
• Inter-PI Overlapping Anomaly occurs when Ni is correlated to Nj and
Ci dominates Cj. In this case, pii and pij must be split into a set of pi
that will be disjointed from each other
Ni ∼ Nj ∧ Ci ≻ Cj ⇒ Overlapping(pii,pij)
• Inter-PI Inter-PI Correlation anomaly occurs if all network fields of pii
and pij are equal, except Ci and Cj that are correlated. Hence we will
create an ambiguity in traffic forwarding because we have to indicate the
correct chain towards forward traffic:
Ni = Nj ∧ Ci ∼ Cj ⇒ Correlated(pii,pij)
9.4 Inter-domain Analysis
Until now, we have shown how the UMPA model can map existing and novel
domain, by applying Intra-domain analysis as the literature does. In fact,
the detection of policy anomalies defined among policies of different domains
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(i.e., Inter-domain anomaly) was generally overlooked by the existing works
on policy analysis. An Inter-domain analysis would allow to check a greater
and more comprehensive set of anomalies than the set that the state of the
art approaches are able to detect. By means of this novel type of analysis,
thus, administrators will achieve a higher flexibility in the definition of network
errors, events and redundancies.
Certainly it is very difficult to have an exhaustive and objective criteria to
establish when a network scenario is a misconfiguration or if it is a weakened
scenario. In fact, the administrator is the only one who can decide which
anomaly is really an undesired situation. For this reason, we show how the
UMPA model can support an Inter-domain analysis by providing some examples
of this novel type of anomalies. In particular, we use the following examples
because they may be reasonably an anomalies in many network scenarios.
Having presented the Filtering and Communication Protection Policies, a
first example can be the Pair-PI Filtered Anomaly. In particular such anomaly
identifies when a certain traffic flow, belonging to a secured communication,
is discarded by a firewall because a rule is installed to deny (aj = deny) such
flow. This means that the secure communication (implemented by the CPP pii)
is interrupted by the FP pij installed in the firewall. Hence, in the proposed
model, the Pair-PI Filtered Anomaly can be expressed in this way:
si ̸⊥ ip_srcj ∧ si ̸⊥ p_srcj ∧ di ̸⊥ ip_dstj∧
di ̸⊥ p_dstj ∧ aj = deny⇒ Filtered(pii, pij)
The last example is the Inter-PI Interruption Anomaly that arises between
the FP and SFC domains: let us consider a traffic flow (K ) that should be
processed by a service chain that contains a firewall (Ci ≻ {fj}), but a filtering
policy was defined so that the flow K must be dropped by the firewall.
This means that the flow K will not traverse the entire service chain:
ip_srci = ip_srcj ∧ ip_dsti = ip_dstj ∧ ti = tj ∧ p_srci = p_srcj∧
p_dsti = p_dstj ∧ aj = {deny} ∧ Ci ≻ {fj}∧ ⇒ Interruption(pii, pij)
Summary on Network Security
Policy Analysis

Chapter 10
Conclusion and Future Works
In this last chapter of the thesis, we recap our contribution in the state of arts
and the possible future works to continue extend this topic.
10.1 Conclusion
This dissertation has proposed two novel types of anomaly analysis of network
security policy: Inter-technology and Inter-domains.
Policy Anomaly Analysis is designed to identify potential errors, conflict
and redundancy among policy rules. In literature, several works and techniques
have been proposed to identify anomalies, however the research is mainly
concentrated on Intra- and Inter-policy analysis. The Intra-Policy analysis
identifies any anomaly among the rules of a single policy, while the Inter-Policy
analysis identifies anomalies among the rules of a set of interconnected policies.
However, the complexity of real systems is not self-contained, as each network
security control may affect the behavior of other controls in the same network.
For this reason, we propose to extend the policy anomaly analysis with two
new types of analysis: Inter-technology and Inter-domain.
The Inter-technology analysis identifies any anomaly among a set of policies
that enforce different security communication technologies (e.g. IPsec, TLS,
SSH). For instance, when an IPsec tunnel encapsulates other TLS tunnels, the
external tunnel is a redundant level of protection.
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The Inter-domain analysis identifies anomalies in a set of policies of different
security policy domains. This is the case of a firewall that blocks some encrypted
communication channels created by a VPN functionalities, which generates
an Inter-domain anomaly between the filtering domain (i.e. firewall) and the
communication-protection one (i.e. VPN).
In order to validate the effectiveness of the Inter-technology analysis, we
have applied it on communication protection policy.
Communication protection policies specify how to protect the network
communications. Their correct deployment is crucial in several areas, such as
protection of intellectual properties, and confidentiality of financial or corporate
data (like credit card numbers).
The presented work on the analysis on communication protection policy
extends the current literature adding new list of nineteen anomalies that can
appear during the implementation or design of communication protection
policies. The proposed anomalies are classified in two taxonomies: an effect-
base taxonomy and an information-specific taxonomy. Through an empirical
assessment we have proved the practical significance of detecting this new class
of anomalies.
Furthermore, during this analysis we have introduced a formal model,
based on first-order logic rules that analyses the network topology and the
security controls at each node to identify the detected anomalies and suggest
the strategies to resolve them.
The opposed model, implement the Inter-technology analysis allowing the
detection of a number of anomalies arising from the interactions between various
protocols (e.g. TLS and SSH), security properties and communication scenarios
such as end-to-end connections, VPNs and remote access communications
(see RFC-3457 [104]). We took into account both communication end-points
(i.e. source and destination), but also tunnel terminators/gateways for a more
accurate detection. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work that
detects and classifies communication Inter-technology policy anomalies. Our
approach internally represents every network device as a tree containing various
“entities”, able to establish or terminate secure communications, which live at
different ISO/OSI levels. Our hierarchical view of networks and network nodes
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improves on existing works, which often only rely on a flat IP address-based
representation of an IT infrastructure.
In addition, we have proposed a graphical view of the detected anomalies
with a simple and intuitive representation, thus facilitating their identification.
This representation is based on multi-graph theory, and it is an equivalent
model with respect to the FOL model.
Moreover, we have performed the Inter-domain analysis defining a unified
model for policy analysis.
This unified analysis model is composed by two parts: the policies imple-
mentation and anomalies detection rules.
• a Policy Implementation, in our model, represents the policy structure and
it is very flexible and customizable. A Policy Implementation identifies
the conditions and events that administrators want to manage and the
policy actions that describe the way those events are managed.
• a detection rule is a set of conditions that distinguish the possible anoma-
lies among Policy Implementations. The detection rules are based on
First Order Logic (FOL) and are expressed using Horn clauses.
The generality of the solution was also validated by applying the model
to three case studies of different domains: communication protection, data
filtering and service function chaining.
10.2 Future Works
In the near future, we plan to extend the expressivity and capabilities of our
unified model adding support for a smart and optimized solution of the conflicts.
This will increase the performance of the network without altering its semantics.
In the medium term, we also plan to add in our model other policy analysis
techniques like policy reachability and policy reconciliation. Unfortunately, this
will require a deeper knowledge of the network state to ensure that the best
policies are chosen and to reconcile policy conflicts.
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Finally for a next future, we also aim to integrate the policy anomaly analysis
module in the Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) and Software-Defined
Networks (SDN).
Thanks to the introduction of NFV and SDN, the concept of Service Function
Chain (SFC) has been defined in literature [103]. A service function chain
defines an ordered set of abstract service functions and ordering constraints that
must be applied to packets and/or flows selected (as a result of classification).
An example of an abstract service function is “a firewall”.
The challenges of service function chain are the same of security controls,
like the complexity of configuring such services or putting them in the correct
order [105].
As it is already envisioned by the I2NSF [106] working group in ETSI, the
configuration of single function is not enough to enforce security in the whole
network, because administrators have to consider also the interactions between
different security functions in a distributed environment for making the network
secure.
For these reasons, our goals are: (i) extend the capability of the UMPA
model in order to support the technology that implements the SFC; (ii) integrate
the policy analysis module in an open-source NFV implementation. This would
provide the NFV orchestrator with additional information, increasing both the
security and the efficiency of the deployment.
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Appendix

Appendix A
Network Security Policy:
Models for Policy Analysis
In this part of the thesis, we provide a detailed presentation of the mathematical
models exploited in existing works of Policy Analysis, which we have mentioned
in Chapter 3.
Decision Diagrams
A Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) is a digital function in terms of a directed,
acyclic graph, which tells the user how to determine the output value of the
function by examining the values of the inputs. The graph is composed of
several decision nodes and terminal nodes. Each decision node is labelled by
a Boolean variable, while the terminal nodes represent value 1 or 0. A BDD
is called ‘ordered’ (OBBD) if different variables appear in the same order on
all paths from the root. The BDD/OBDD is intended to provide a convenient
means of finding the output of one or more functions for any given input.
A Interval Decision Diagram (IDD) is a generalization of BDD and MDD
(Multi Decision Diagram), allowing diagram variables to be integers and child
nodes to be associated with intervals rather than single values. Equivalent to
BDDs, IDDs have a ordered form (OIDDs), providing a canonical representation
of a functions which is important for formal verification.
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Fig. A.1 Example of an Interval Decision Diagram.
First-order logic
First-order logic (FOL) is a richer language than propositional logic, it contains
not only the symbols ∧, ∨, ¬, and → from propositional logic, but also the
symbols ∃ and ∀ along with different symbols to represent variables, constants,
and relations.
Logical consequence in FOL is only semi-decidable: if a sentence A implies
a sentence B then this can be discovered, but if A does not imply B, this does
not mean that A implies the negation of B.
A deductive system is used to demonstrate that one formula is a logical
consequence of another formula. There are many such systems for FOL these
share the common property that a deduction is a finite syntactic object; the
format of this object, and the way it is constructed, vary widely.
Association Rule Mining
The Association Rule Mining was first introduced by Agrawal et al. [107]. An
association rule is an implication of the form: X → Y , where X, Y are two
disjoint sets. The goal of Association Rule Mining is to extract correlations,
frequent patterns, associations and/or casual structures among sets of items in
the transaction databases.
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Propositional Satisfiability Problem
The propositional satisfiability problem abbreviated as SATISFIABILITY
(often called SAT) is the problem of determining whether a set of sentences in
propositional logic is satisfiable.
In practice, many automated reasoning problems in propositional logic are
first reduced to satisfiability problems and then solved by using a satisfiability
solver. Today, SAT solvers are commonly used in hardware design, software
analysis, planning, mathematics, security analysis, and many other areas.
Finite State Machine
A Finite State Machine (FSM) describe models that contains finite number of
states and produces outputs on state transitions after receiving inputs. FSM
are widely used to model systems in diverse areas.
A FSM m is a quintuple: m = (I, O, S, δ, λ). Where:
• I is the finite set of symbols representing input to m;
• O is the finite set of symbols representing output to m;
• S is the finite set of symbols representing states of m;
• δ : S × I → S is the state transition function ;
• λ : S × I → O is the output function.
When the machine is in a current state s1 in S and receives an input i1 a from I
it moves to the next state s2 = δ(s1, i1) and produces an output o1 = λ(s1, i1).
An FSM can be represented by a State Transition Diagram (STD). An STD
is a directed graph where the vertices are the states of the machine and the
edges are the state transitions. In addition each edge is labelled with the input
and output associated with the transitions.
Geometrical model
The geometrical model represent a policy is a function represented as a four-
tuple (R,R,E, ad), where:
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• R = {ri}i, i ∈ [1, n] is the rule set.
• R : 2R → A is the resolution function used to decide the action for packets
matching more than one rule. An example of resolution function is the
First Matching Rule strategy (FMR) that, in case of multiple matching
rules, selects the action from the rule at highest priority. The firewall
action set includes “allow” and “deny” actions and will be indicated as
A = {a, d}.
• E = {E1, E2, . . .} is the set of external data associated to the rules.
External data are not part of the rules, nevertheless they are used to take
decisions. The association is done using a set of external data functions
εk : R → Ek. FMR uses priorities as external data. The function that
associates rules to priorities will be denoted by π.
• ad is the default action, applied when a packet matches no rules.
Rules ri = (ci, ai) are composed of a condition clause ci and an action ai
∈ A. The conditions clause is defined as:
ci = si1 × · · · × si1 ⊆ Si1 × · · · × Sim = S
where each condition sij is a subset of a selector Sij. Examples of selectors
are the protocol fields mentioned previously, like IP source address and port
number. The set S =Si1 × · · · × Sim is named decision space. The condition
clause ci is thus a hyper-rectangle (or the union of hyper-rectangles) in S.
Appendix B
Communication Protection
Policies: Validation Materials
We now provide additional materials regarding the validation of our analysis
model of Communication Protection Policies, presented in Chapters 7 and. In
particular, we present the configurations of some selected security controls and
the mapping of their configuration into our model as a set of PIs (see Chapter 5)
to prove the expressiveness of our approach and the easiness of the translation.
B.1 Example of system configuration
Translating data and channel protection configurations into/from the policy
representations we use in our model is a straightforward task. The policy
implementations convey in a very compact way all the information that is
needed to correctly configure the security controls. To prove our claim, we
provide the mapping of configurations of three different technologies, using the
scenario depicted in Fig. B.11: 1) IPsec, by mapping a strongSwan2 configu-
ration for an end-to-end, site-to-site and remote access channels; 2) TLS, by
mapping an OpenVPN3 configuration to establish a secure tunnel; 3) SSH, by
mapping a SSH tunnel configuration. Analogously, all the configurations of the
1The figure was retrieved from https://www.strongswan.org/test-scenarios.html.
2See https://www.strongswan.org/.
3See https://openvpn.net/index.php/open-source/documentation/.
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Fig. B.1 Network scenarios.
secure communications used in our analysis model can be mapped into policy
implementations.
B.1.1 IPsec configurations (strongSwan)
Listing B.1 shows a strongSwan end-to-end connection from the host 192.168.0.100
to the IP address 192.168.0.200, which requires aes256-sha512-modp2048 as
ESP parameters.✞
config setup
conn %default
ikelifetime =60m
keylife =20m
rekeymargin =3m
keyingtries =1
keyexchange=ikev1
conn end2end
left =192.168.0.100
leftcert=moonCert.pem
leftid=@moon.strongswan.org
leftfirewall=yes
right =192.168.0.200
rightid=@sun.strongswan.org
ike=aes256 -sha512 -modp2048
esp=aes256 -sha512 -modp2048✝ ✆
Listing B.1 End-to-end strongSwan configuration.
B.1 Example of system configuration 141
This configuration is summarized by the following PI:
(192.168.0.100, 192.168.0.200, IPsec, (5, 5, 5), ∗,∅)
Listing B.2 presents a site-to-site configuration between the subnets 10.1.0.0/16
and 10.2.0.0/16 operated by the gateways whose IP addresses are 192.168.0.1
and 192.168.0.2, respectively.✞
conn %default
ikelifetime =60m
keylife =20m
rekeymargin =3m
keyingtries =1
keyexchange=ikev1
conn site2site
left =192.168.0.1
leftcert=moonCert.pem
leftid=@moon.strongswan.org
leftsubnet =10.1.0.0/16
leftfirewall=yes
right =192.168.0.2
rightid=@sun.strongswan.org
rightsubnet =10.2.0.0/16
ike=aes256 -sha512 -modp2048
esp=aes256 -sha512 -modp2048✝ ✆
Listing B.2 Site-to-site strongSwan configuration.
This configuration can be represented with the following PI:
(192.168.0.1, 192.168.0.2, IPsec, (5, 5, 5), (10.1.0.0/16, ∗, 10.2.0.0/16, ∗, ∗),∅)
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Finally, Listing B.3 configures a remote access for the host 192.168.0.100 to
allow access the subnet 10.2.0.0/16 through the gateway 192.168.0.1.
✞
conn %default
ikelifetime =60m
keylife =20m
rekeymargin =3m
keyingtries =1
keyexchange=ikev1
conn remoteAccess
left =192.168.0.100
leftsourceip =% config
leftcert=carolCert.pem
leftid=carol@strongswan.org
leftfirewall=yes
right =192.168.0.1
rightsubnet =10.1.0.0/16
rightid=@moon.strongswan.org
ike=aes256 -sha512 -modp2048
esp=aes256 -sha512 -modp2048✝ ✆
Listing B.3 Remote access strongSwan configuration.
The policy implementation for this configuration is:
(192.168.0.100, 192.168.0.1, IPsec, (5, 5, 5), (∗, ∗, 10.2.0.0/16, ∗, ∗),∅)
B.1.2 TLS (OpenVPN)
Listing B.4 shows a configuration for OpenVPN of a tunnel from the generic
client 192.168.0.100 to the server 192.168.0.150:1194 (Webserver), which requires
the enforcement of a cipher-suite that uses Diffie-Hellman with AES-256-CBC
and SHA512.
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✞
client
dev tun
proto udp
remote Webserver 192.168.0.150 :1194
nobind
ca ca.crt
cert client.crt
key client.key
remote -cert -tls server
tls -auth ta.key 1
cipher AES -256-CBC
auth SHA -512
dh dh1024.pem✝ ✆
Listing B.4 Client side OpenVPN 2.0 configuration.
This configuration translates into the following PI:
(192.168.1.100 : ∗, 192.168.0.150:1194,TLS, (5, 5, 5), ∗,∅)
Listing B.5 shows the relative OpenVPN configuration of the server.✞
local 192.168.0.150
port 1194
dev tun
proto udp
keepalive 10 120
ca ca.crt
cert server.crt
key server.key
tls -auth ta.key 0
cipher AES -256-CBC
auth SHA -512
dh dh1024.pem✝ ✆
Listing B.5 Server side OpenVPN 2.0 configuration.
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B.1.3 SSH
Listing B.6 presents the configuration of an SSH tunnel for the user whose
username is ‘client’ and its IP address is 192.168.0.200. The user connects to
the SSH server at 192.168.0.150:22022, which uses AES256-CBC and SHA512
to secure the data and enters the local network 10.0.0.0/16 with the 10.0.0.3
IP address on port 3306.✞
Host tunnel
#SSH connection setting
HostName 192.168.0.150
User dave
Port 22022
IdentityFile ~/. ssh/client.example.key
Ciphers aes256 -cbc
MACs hmac -sha2 -512
#SSH tunnel setting
LocalForward 10.0.0.3 :3306 127.0.0.0 :3306✝ ✆
Listing B.6 Client side SSH configuration.
The PI corresponding to this SSH configuration is:
(192.168.2.100 : ∗, 192.168.2.1:22022, SSH, (5, 5, 5),
(10.0.0.3, 8080, 192.168.2.1, 3306, TCP ),∅)
B.2 Graphical user interface
A graphical user interface was developed referring to the model representation
described in Chapter 6. In the interface, PI are called Logica Association
Implementation (LAimpl)4.
4The GUI was developed in the context of the European protect PoSeCo[108].
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